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This paper explores the political economy of the 
groundnut value chain in Malawi. The paper is based 
on an extensive literature review of authoritative 
studies of the groundnut value chain in Malawi, 
including recent policies and regulations that govern it. 
Secondary sources, particularly official statistics, were 
consulted to illuminate the structure and performance 
of the groundnut value chain. This evidence was 
complemented by interviews with key and influential 
actors in the value chain, drawn from civil society, 
especially farmers’ organisations, government, 
the private sector, academia, and donor agencies. 
Some of these interviews provided an opportunity 
to discuss the political dimensions of the functioning 
and performance of the value chain with a particular 
focus on the interests and holding power of different 
actors and how these influence policy, practice, and 
outcomes.
This paper therefore uses a combination of insights 
from the theoretical perspectives of political 
settlement, rents, and policymaking to examine the 
groundnut value chain in Malawi. Fused together, these 
theoretical perspectives underpin a political economy 
analysis (PEA) framework, which entails systematically 
mapping all key actors in an issue area; identifying their 
interests and recognising their forms of power (political, 
economic, social, and ideological); understanding 
their relationships with each other; and appreciating 
the issues, narratives, and ideas that shape how and 
why they interact with each other. With these political 
economy lenses, the paper addresses the following 
three substantive questions and three hypotheses, 
respectively, to understand the status of the groundnut 
value chain in Malawi:
• What are the underlying dynamics of social 
differentiation within the groundnut value 
chain?
• What is the impact of climate change on the 
productivity and profitability of the groundnut 
value chain?
• What is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on the agri-food systems in Malawi through 
the experiences of the groundnut value chain?
• If the country is landlocked, engagement in 
the value chain by national elites takes the 
form of acquiring land for crop production, 
seeking to secure reliable market outlets and 
prices for their produce through manipulation 
of state policies, and/or orchestrating the 
availability of cheap inputs (e.g. fertilisers), 
equipment (e.g. tractors), and services that 
they can ‘capture’.
• If production of the crop primarily takes place 
in sub-national regions with high population 
density (greater than 200 persons per km2); 
production and sale for market are both 
dominated by smallholder farmers, despite 
the interest of larger players in entering the 
value chain. Conversely, where production of 
the crop primarily takes place in sub-national 
regions with low to medium population 
density (less than 200 persons per km2); 
medium and perhaps also large-scale 
farms have expanded their production and 
marketing of the crop dramatically over the 
past decade.
• If traditional development partners have 
engaged actively with the value chain over the 
past decade: policy interventions have both 
been designed to stimulate commercialisation 
in some form or another and to facilitate the 
participation of smallholder farmers in the 
resulting commercialisation processes.
This study paid particular focus to the gender dimension 
of social differentiation in the groundnut value chain, 
while recognising the role of intersectionality in 
social differentiation. Intersectionality focuses on 
understanding how aspects of a person’s social and 
political identities combine to create different modes 
of discrimination and privilege. The focus areas of this 
paper, among other aspects, are the barriers to entry 
and/or requirements for men and women to participate 
in the value chain; the differences in men’s and 
women’s ability to maintain or improve their position 
in the value chain; and the differences in men’s and 
women’s ability to access and control benefits from the 
value chain.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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This paper has demonstrated that the groundnut 
value chain is a potentially significant alternative to 
the collapsing tobacco industry, but it is currently 
neglected by government, while being exploited by a 
cartel of traders (domestic and foreign), technocrats, 
and politicians for selfish interests. Legumes (mainly 
groundnuts, soya beans, and pigeon peas) have been 
designated as potential replacement crops for the 
fledgling tobacco sector, as a leading foreign exchange 
earner, in the National Export Strategy (NES) (2012–
2018). However, this strategy has not been matched 
with government efforts to facilitate its realisation. The 
mainstream narrative simply projects the groundnut 
value chain in Malawi as unviable because of its limited 
productivity. The low levels of productivity are due to the 
dominance of smallholder farmers in the value chain; 
the unattractiveness of the value chain to private sector 
investment, especially the groundnut seed system, 
which is key to improved productivity; and the inability 
of most producers, especially smallholder farmers, 
to limit aflatoxin to acceptable levels, particularly for 
regional export markets and beyond.
The story told in this paper explains the rise and fall of 
the groundnut value chain, as well as its re-emergence 
in a fundamentally reconstituted political, economic, 
and social context. Between the 1970s and 1980s, 
groundnuts were one of the leading cash crops exported 
to Europe, as well as regional markets, but this trade 
collapsed at the turn of the 1990s. Both production 
and exports of groundnuts collapsed due to the failure 
to contain aflatoxin contamination to acceptable levels, 
as demanded by the European market. Aflatoxin 
is regarded as a serious health hazard, which has 
the potential to cause liver cancer. The collapse of 
the groundnut value chain was exacerbated by the 
introduction of structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF, 
which fundamentally changed the institutional context 
of the groundnut value chain (Matita 2018; Mgalamadzi 
2018). The reference to SAPs is still relevant three 
decades or so later, largely because of the enduring 
legacy that the policies have had on the country’s 
ability to drive its development agenda, which have 
been informed by endogenous rather than exogenous 
considerations.
There have been several efforts to revive the production, 
as well as the export, of groundnuts. These initiatives 
have been largely successful in terms of reviving 
groundnut productivity, but have failed to reclaim the 
share of the export market that collapsed at the turn of 
the 1990s. The revival in the productivity of groundnuts 
is attributed to several policy interventions, some of 
which are locally driven, while others are externally 
supported. However, the most notable policy in this 
regard is the NES (2012–2018). This strategy sought to 
promote legumes or oil seeds (groundnuts, soya beans, 
and pigeon peas) as potential alternatives to tobacco, 
as a leading foreign exchange earner, especially in 
view of the intensification of the anti-smoking lobby. 
The paradox, however, is that the designation of 
oil seeds as a potential alternative leading foreign 
exchange earner has not been matched by public 
investment to promote the progressive development 
of these value chains. Public investment to support, 
for example, ready access to seed for the crops 
is very limited. The existing seed system is largely 
supported by development partners, such as the 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and Irish Aid, which have been instrumental 
in the development of improved varieties. However, 
these improved varieties have not been made readily 
available to farmers. 
The findings of this study demonstrate the impact of 
intersectionality on the welfare of women. Women 
are adversely affected in the groundnut value chain, 
not only because they are generally poorer than their 
male counterparts, but also because of the cultural, 
traditional, and social orientations that limit their sphere 
of action. Women are expected to carry out essentially 
all unpaid domestic work and they are not culturally 
expected to venture into economic activities that take 
them away from the homestead for prolonged periods 
without being sanctioned by the menfolk, even when 
they are not married. In cases where they are said to 
have control over land, women still cannot make critical 
decisions about it without deferring to their brothers, 
uncles, husbands, and even elder sons. The question 
of intersectionality applies to poorer men and youth as 
well. Poorer men tend to have limited access to land 
or are landless, usually depend on exploitative casual 
labour for employment, and are often disadvantaged 
in leadership positions, which are very key for social 
mobility in a context where patron-client relationships 
are dominant. The youth lack access to land in their own 
right, they cannot participate in clubs or associations, 
and cannot access lucrative markets when they 
manage to produce groundnuts. The impacts of 
COVID-19 have underscored the intersectionality 
of social differentiation, which affects the welfare of 
women, poorer men, and youth. These groups have 
not been able to access markets, even the informal 
ones, which have been largely monopolised by men 
who have better social capital networks that they can 
leverage in these difficult circumstances.
The study further demonstrates that there are winners 
and losers within the framework of the groundnut value 
chain, even though it is suffering neglect and only the 
chaotic informal markets are thriving. There is some 
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contestation between and among actors with regards 
to the operation of export mandates, which, if properly 
implemented, would help to formalise commodity 
exports from the country. This, in turn, would enhance 
the proceeds that the country gets from agriculture, 
which are currently very low. While there seems to be 
general appreciation about the desirability of putting 
export mandates in place, there are contestations 
about exactly how this should be done. The positions of 
the key stakeholders, as discussed in this paper, show 
that each stakeholder group is bent on protecting their 
benefits, arising from the current configuration of the 
value chain. Behind the position of each stakeholder 
there are specific interests that they want to promote, 
either by pushing for the export mandates to operate 
in a particular way, or avoiding the operationalisation of 
the mandates altogether. The interests of the different 
stakeholders are further evident in the operations of 
the Mgona informal groundnut export market. Mgona 
is a thriving market despite its obvious illegality. Both 
traders and government officials condemn it, but 
no concrete action has been taken to regulate it or 
abandon it altogether. While farmer organisations 
have attempted to bring up the issue of this market 
and its ramifications on the commodity market, it 
continues to operate within a 20km radius from the 
seat of government and in the context of a newly 
operationalised CGA (2017). Under this Act, a trader 
in agricultural commodities is required to obtain an 
authorisation letter from the Ministry of Agriculture 
before applying for a license from the Ministry of Trade. 
This means that any trader who imports or exports 
licensable goods without a requisite license commits 
an offense punishable by law.
The experiences of the groundnut value chain in Malawi 
demonstrate that agricultural policy processes are 
inherently political. While policies that are implemented 
are broadly touted as being in the interest of 
smallholder farmers, or indeed, farmers more broadly, 
stakeholders at each stage in the value chain have 
particular interests that they want to promote, often 
for selfish interests and motives. The losers are almost 
always the smallholder farmers. This realisation, serves 
to emphasise that policies are often implemented, 
not because they are poised to make a difference to 
the livelihoods of Malawians, but because they will 
facilitate the extraction of rents and direct benefits for 
the political elite (Chinsinga 2018; Cammack 2010). 
The significance of PEA, therefore, is that it helps to 
identify and understand the political, economic, and 
social processes that promote or block pro-poor 
change, as well as the role of institutions, power, and 
the underlying policy context.
The fate of groundnut commercialisation in Malawi is 
a combination of several factors, but the watershed 
moment remains the introduction of SAP policy 
prescriptions. The responses to the debilitating effects 
of SAPs, coupled with the culture of opportunism 
and corruption inherent in the competitive clientelist 
political settlement, has led to the re-emergence of 
the groundnut value chain in an informal and chaotic 
context. This has led to the apparent strategic 
neglect and consequent capture of the value chain 
by a cartel of politicians, technocrats, and traders 
(local and foreign). So, while the groundnut value 
chain has tremendous potential as an alternative to 
the fledging tobacco industry, this potential cannot 
be realised because of the perverse incentives that 
underpin Malawi’s contemporary political economy. 
Through the groundnut value chain, this paper 
therefore demonstrates how different groups in society 
compete for and use resources, rents, and power at 
their disposal. The findings imply that the manner in 
which competition for and use of resources, rents, and 
power pans out, either leads to growth, transformation, 
and improved well-being, or stagnation and poverty 
(Prowse and Grassin 2020).
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1 SETTING THE CONTEXT
This paper explores the political economy of the 
groundnut value chain in Malawi, building on questions 
and issues raised in the seminal work of the Agricultural 
Policy Research in Africa (APRA) consortium on the 
political economy of agricultural commercialisation 
in Africa (Poulton and Chinsinga 2018). While several 
questions were raised by Poulton and Chinsinga (2018), 
this paper zeroes in on those that are applicable and 
relevant to Malawi’s context. These questions and 
issues were framed as hypotheses to shed light on 
the underlying drivers of and blockages to agricultural 
commercialisation in Africa and the details are provided 
in Annex 1. The paper is based on an extensive literature 
review of authoritative studies of the groundnut value 
chain in Malawi, including recent policies and regulations 
that govern it. Secondary sources, particularly official 
statistics, were consulted to illuminate the structure 
and performance of the groundnut value chain. This 
evidence was complemented by interviews with key 
and influential actors in the value chain, drawn from civil 
society, especially farmers’ organisations, government, 
the private sector, academia, and donor agencies. 
Some of these interviews provided an opportunity to 
discuss the political dimensions of the functioning 
and performance of the value chain with a particular 
focus on the interests and holding power of different 
actors and how these influence policy, practice, and 
outcomes.1
For the purpose of this paper, a value chain is defined 
as a set of interlinked activities that work to add value 
to a product, and consists of actors and actions that 
improve the product while linking commodity producers 
to processors and markets (Norton 2014). In examining 
the questions and issues of interest to this paper, the 
primary focus was on the institutional and governance 
dimensions of the groundnut value chain in Malawi. The 
focus was mainly on the mechanisms through which the 
value chain participants are organised, which relates to 
institutional frameworks, rents, and governance. These 
mechanisms are very important to understanding the 
power and profits held by different actors and how 
the power and profits are distributed, particularly for 
smallholder farmers (Prowse and Grassin 2020). This 
1  Most of the interviewees preferred anonymity in view of the sensitivity of the issues that were discussed about the groundnut value 
chain. For this reason, the interviewees are not explicitly identified, except in cases where matters directly linked to them are not 
deemed sensitive. The details of the interviews are provided in Annex 2.
paper therefore uses a combination of insights from 
the theoretical perspectives of political settlement, 
rents, and policymaking to examine the groundnut 
value chain in Malawi. Fused together, these theoretical 
perspectives underpin a political economy analysis 
(PEA) framework. The overarching goal of the PEA 
framework is to illuminate on how groups in a society 
compete for and use resources, rents, and power to 
advance their interests (Prowse and Grassin 2020). 
This entails systematically mapping all key actors in an 
issue area; identifying their interests and recognising 
their forms of power (political, economic, social, and 
ideological); understanding their relationships with 
each other; and appreciating the issues, narratives, and 
ideas that shape how and why they interact with each 
other. The underlying argument is that the distribution 
of organisational power is important for understanding 
the economic and political effects of institutions and 
policies. This implies that policymaking does not 
happen in neat and predictable step-by-step fashion, 
informed by problem free or neutral knowledge; it 
is a highly contested process (Khan 2017; Laws and 
Leftwich 2014; Keely and Scoones 2003).
With these political economy lenses, the paper 
addresses the following three substantive questions 
and three hypotheses, respectively, to understand the 
status of the groundnut value chain in Malawi:
• What are the underlying dynamics of social 
differentiation within the groundnut value 
chain?
• What is the impact of climate change on the 
productivity and profitability of the groundnut 
value chain?
• What is the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the agri-food systems in Malawi 
through the experiences of the groundnut 
value chain?
• If the country is landlocked, engagement in 
the value chain by national elites takes the 
form of acquiring land for crop production, 
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seeking to secure reliable market outlets and 
prices for their produce through manipulation 
of state policies, and/or orchestrating the 
availability of cheap inputs (e.g. fertilisers), 
equipment (e.g. tractors), and services that 
they can ‘capture’.
• If production of the crop primarily takes place 
in sub-national regions with high population 
density (greater than 200 persons per km2); 
production and sale for market are both 
dominated by smallholder farmers, despite 
the interest of larger players in entering the 
value chain. Conversely, where production of 
the crop primarily takes place in sub-national 
regions with low to medium population 
density (less than 200 persons per km2); 
medium and perhaps also large-scale 
farms have expanded their production and 
marketing of the crop dramatically over the 
past decade.
• If traditional development partners have 
engaged actively with the value chain over the 
past decade: policy interventions have both 
been designed to stimulate commercialisation 
in some form or another and to facilitate the 
participation of smallholder farmers in the 
resulting commercialisation processes.
Social differentiation entails distinction between 
groups and individuals on the basis of biological 
and sociocultural factors, such as sex, age, class, or 
ethnicity, resulting in assignment of roles and status 
in society. In this paper, particular focus is paid to 
the gender dimension of social differentiation in the 
groundnut value chain, while recognising the role of 
intersectionality in social differentiation. Intersectionality 
focuses on understanding how aspects of a person’s 
social and political identities combine to create 
different modes of discrimination and privilege. It is 
a prism for seeing the way in which various forms of 
inequality often operate together and exacerbate each 
other (Crenshaw 1989). It illustrates how people’s 
social identities can overlap, creating compounded 
experiences of discrimination. The focus areas of this 
paper, among other aspects, are the barriers to entry 
and/or requirements for men and women to participate 
in the value chain; the differences in men’s and women’s 
ability to maintain or improve their position in the value 
chain; and the differences in men’s and women’s ability 
to access and control benefits from the value chain. 
2 The Government of Malawi Youth Policy (2013) officially defines youth as all persons from age 10 to 35 years, regardless of their 
sex, race, education, culture, economic, marital and physical status. The policy observes that the definition of youth has continuously 
changed in response to political, economic, and social perspectives. However, communities in both rural and urban areas, tend 
to define youth to include even those that are beyond 35-years-old, as long as they are not married, although they may be living 
independent lives (see, for example, Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012).
These are gender-based constraints because they are 
linked to particular laws or practices that are different 
for men and women (Rubin, Manfre and Nichol-Barret 
2009). 
The findings of this paper demonstrate that the 
groundnut value chain has huge potential to contribute 
to the transformation of Malawi’s agriculture sector, 
especially among smallholder farmers. A viable 
groundnut value chain can serve as a leading source 
of income through both domestic and export trade, 
as demand on both fronts remain unmet. Although 
the groundnut value chain exudes this enormous 
potential, it does not receive adequate attention 
from the public sector in order to fully unleash its full 
potential in the country’s agriculture portfolio. Instead, 
the groundnut value chain has been captured by a 
cartel of traders (local and foreign), technocrats, and 
politicians, who make supernormal profits through the 
thriving informal export trade, especially within the sub-
region. While legumes (mainly groundnuts, soya beans, 
and pigeon peas) have been designated as potential 
replacement crops for the fledgling tobacco sector, 
as a leading foreign exchange earner, in the National 
Export Strategy (NES) (2012–2018) (GoM 2012), this 
strategy has not been matched with government 
determination to facilitate its realisation. There is also a 
great deal of social differentiation within the groundnut 
value chain, shaped to a great extent by the broader 
processes of social differentiation in rural Malawi. 
This social differentiation demonstrates the impact of 
intersectional barriers on the livelihoods of women, 
poorer men, and youth.2 The mainstream narrative 
simply projects the groundnut value chain in Malawi 
as unviable because of limited productivity, due to the 
dominance of smallholder farmers in the value chain; 
the unattractiveness of the value chain to private sector 
investment, especially the groundnut seed system, 
which is key to improved productivity; and the inability 
of most producers, especially smallholder farmers, 
to limit aflatoxin to acceptable levels, particularly 
for regional export markets and beyond. Moreover, 
efforts to resuscitate and formalise the export trade of 
commodities, including legumes, through structured 
markets such as commodity exchange platforms, are 
fiercely resisted. Meanwhile, the informal export trade, 
particularly of groundnuts, continues to thrive and is not 
even disguised.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section II briefly sketches out the conceptual and 
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empirical underpinnings of the paper. The first part 
discusses the theoretical scaffolds of the paper, rooted 
in the PEA tradition that fuses together ideas about 
political settlement, rent, and policymaking processes. 
The second part provides a quick review of Malawi’s 
political settlement, especially in terms of how it has 
evolved following the transition to democracy in May 
1994, with particular reference to its implications 
for rent management and policymaking processes. 
Section III maps out the groundnut value chain in terms 
of the major actors, its performance from contemporary 
and historical perspectives, and key policy drivers for 
its successes and failures. Section IV focuses on the 
apparent resurgence of the groundnut value chain, 
following its collapse towards the end of the 1980s. It 
addresses the factors driving the resurgence, including 
policy initiatives and efforts, as well as obstacles, such 
as climate change. Section V discusses the apparent 
strategic neglect and capture of the value chain by 
focusing on the thriving informal export trade, which 
generates millions of US dollars, while efforts to 
formalise trade are fiercely resisted. Section VI turns to 
the underlying dynamics of social differentiation within 
the groundnut value chain, while paying attention to how 
forces in this context interact with forces in the wider 
context to produce outcomes that tend to marginalise 
women on several fronts. Section VII explores how the 
COVID-19 pandemic has affected the country’s agri-
food system through the lens of the groundnut value 
chain. Section VIII offers some concluding remarks and 
reflections.
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2.1 Political settlement, rents and 
policymaking
 
Political settlement, rents, and policymaking as 
conceptual scaffolds are rooted in the PEA tradition, 
which is broadly concerned with the dynamic 
interactions between structures, institutions, and actors, 
to understand how decisions are made in countries, 
societies, and sectors (Laws and Leftwich 2014). There 
are competing definitions of political settlement, but 
regardless of the definition used, it helps shed light 
on issues of rent management and policymaking 
processes in a country, society, or even sector. For the 
purposes of this paper, political settlement is defined 
as the balance or distribution of power between 
contending social groups and classes on which any 
state is based. Defining political settlement in this way 
helps to focus attention on intra-elite contention and 
bargaining; contention and bargaining between elites 
and non-elites; and contention and bargaining between 
those who occupy the state and society more broadly 
(Di John and Putzel 2009). This means that political 
settlement allows for a more detailed understanding of 
how the interests, ideas, and relations of power among 
leaders, elites, and coalitions can assist or obstruct the 
process of change.
The distribution of power that a political settlement 
underpins, entails the likelihood of particular 
organisations holding out in contests seeking to 
influence institutional outcomes (Khan 2017). Powerful 
organisations can outclass competitors in contests of 
power and authority because they can either deploy 
more resources to influence governments or other 
organisations, inflict greater costs on competitors, 
or hold out for longer because they can absorb 
more damage until others give in. The holding power 
of organisations is not just based on economic 
capabilities, or on whether they include elites, but also 
on their organisational capabilities to mobilise and 
their skills in identifying and rewarding the right people 
through formal or informal networks. This invariably 
draws attention to the fact that political settlement does 
not only refer to the formal architecture of politics, but 
also the web of informal rules, shared understandings, 
and rooted habits that are at the heart of every political 
system (OECD 2011). Consequently, groups that may 
appear powerful in terms of their formal and economic 
positions in society may not be able to actually enforce 
compliance with the formal and informal institutions 
they desire, leading to a much more complex 
relationship between institutions and paths of political 
and economic change (Gray 2019). 
The contestations between and among groups in 
countries, societies, or sectors produce winners and 
losers. The tendency for winners is to push for the 
maintenance of the status quo, whereas losers push 
for changes to the status quo so that they can become 
winners should their desired social, economic, or 
political institutional arrangement be realised. This is 
inevitable because processes of institutional change 
are never neutral, they distribute advantages to some 
and disadvantages to others such that they mobilise 
bias in some way or another. The processes of 
institutional change are thus often heavily contested 
by diverse interests with different forms and degrees 
of power, influence, and authority. This creates 
winners and losers, which have a bearing on social 
differentiation processes in a country, society, or even 
in a sector. While seminal work on social differentiation 
leaned heavily toward the functionalist perspective, 
emphasising that it is imperative for the preservation of 
the social system, there is increasing recognition that 
it also creates the potential for structured inequalities 
built into the larger social system, giving unequal 
access and opportunities to different groups. It is, 
therefore, construed as a double-edged sword. While 
from a functionalist perspective, structured inequality 
can be seen as an efficient way to organise society, it 
can also lead to conflict and social problems, including 
poverty.
Building on two competing contemporary perspectives 
of social differentiation, Dancer and Hossain (2018) 
argue that the analysis of social differentiation draws 
attention to the interconnection between individual 
agency, social structures, and wider political 
developments. According to Berry (1993), social 
differentiation arises out of local social relations that 
are fluid and dynamic, underpinned by struggles over 
resources, while Hall, Scoones and Tsikata (2017) 
attribute social differentiation to situations such as 
commoditisation and economic liberalisation, which 
2 THE CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE RESEARCH
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produce and deepen inequality and exclusion for 
certain groups. Dancer and Hossain (2018) emphasise 
the importance of intersectionality in understanding 
the underlying dynamics of social differentiation in 
a country, society, or even a sector. Intersectionality 
seeks to understand the complexity of interactions 
across multiple forms of social categories, including 
gender, age, class, religion, and ethnicity, in shaping 
social structures and matrices of inequality and 
oppression. The processes of social differentiation 
have consequential impacts for the empowerment of 
people in society, especially women and girls. Dancer 
and Hossain (2018) define empowerment as a process 
of change through which groups that have been 
denied the ability to make strategic life choices come 
to acquire that ability. 
2.2 A brief overview of Malawi’s 
political settlement
 
Examining Malawi’s political settlement and its 
underlying rent management and policymaking 
processes is very important because the primary 
interests of the governing elite are paramount in 
driving, shaping, and influencing development and 
programme and/or project implementation outcomes 
(Chinsinga 2018). The dominant tendency for elites is 
to frame development interventions, as well as their 
implementation, in a manner that would retain them in 
power. This takes full cognizance of the fact that the 
underlying political settlement is never static. Changes 
in the political landscape often alter the underlying 
interests of political elites, as well as the networks 
and coalitions behind those interests, with potentially 
different development and/or project implementation 
outcomes. According to Prowse and Grassin (2020), 
vested interests within elite circles swirl around and 
soak into governance processes, since they always 
want to ensure that their interests are served.
Malawi’s political settlement has experienced 
significant change, following the transition from a one-
party dictatorship to a multi-party democracy in May 
1994, largely in terms of rent management. However, its 
underlying operative dynamics have remained squarely 
intact (Prowse and Grassin 2020; Cammack 2010). 
From an authoritarian developmental patrimonialism 
with centralised and systematic rent management, 
underpinned by policy driving patronage, Malawi has 
evolved into a competitive clientelist regime, where 
patronage drives policy and is underpinned by rampant 
fraud, corruption, nepotism, and sheer opportunism 
with a decentralised rent management system. Prowse 
and Grassin (2020) make an interesting observation in 
this regard. They argue that patrimonialism contributes 
to or constrains fundamental structural transformation, 
depending on whether the control of rents is centralised 
and long-term or dispersed and for instant gratification. 
The fairly impressive development achieved during the 
one-party dictatorship between July 1964 and May 
1994 is attributed to three main factors. These are: 1) 
the distribution of rents and assets to actors who made 
use of them productively; 2) an insulated professional 
cadre of civil service technocrats; and 3) the clear 
planning of development priorities and effective 
implementation.
One of the major persistent challenges that Malawi 
grapples with is its failure to diversify its agricultural 
portfolio. Malawi remains hooked to maize as its staple 
food, despite efforts to diversify over the past five 
decades (Scott and Chinsinga 2018). While the subsidy 
support programmes implemented since the late 
1990s have attempted to facilitate diversification of the 
country’s crop portfolio, these efforts have not been 
very successful. A very good example in this regard 
is the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) that was 
implemented between 2005 and 2020. Even though 
FISP was designed to cater for crop diversification and 
efforts were continually made to ensure that this was 
achieved, it was implemented in a blanket fashion, 
despite the poor performance of maize in some areas. 
Not only were legumes not regularly included in the 
FISP package to facilitate diversification, farmers in 
areas where maize does not do well could have been 
supplied with alternative crops, such as sweet potatoes 
or cassava. This is not surprising because policies 
concerning maize and its status as the country’s 
staple lie at the heart of Malawi’s political economy. 
The emotive issue of maize security underlies policies 
that are reactive rather than proactive and riddled with 
opportunities for rent seeking (World Bank 2018). As a 
result, maize is subject to ad hoc maize export bans, 
driven by the political imperative of food insecurity, even 
though this disincentivises investments in commercial 
farming and agricultural growth (Scott and Chinsinga 
2018).
These political settlement dynamics are anchored 
by the enduring one-party political culture, which 
has changed and adapted to multi-partyism and 
elections, without losing its force (Cammack, Kelsall 
and Booth 2018; Chinsinga 2018). This political culture 
is characterised by the prevalence of patronage, 
clientelism, opportunism, and corruption; the 
centralised authoritarian tendency of the executive; the 
relative weakness of the citizenry and civil society vis-
à-vis the state; the narrowness of the public sphere; 
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the deference to hierarchy; and gender discrimination.3 
Consequently, rather than basing their campaigns on 
ideologies or issues, most politicians have promised 
goods or have appealed to ethnic, regional, or religious 
identity to gain political support. This has ended up 
creating powerful Presidents because political parties 
in the country are built around a ‘big-man’ or a ‘big 
woman’ with members drawn together because of their 
shared loyalty to him, rather than a unifying ideology. 
The resulting political configuration makes it easier for 
politicians to advance their personal agendas because 
there is little clarity or widely shared understanding 
of what is in the public interest. Politicians’ personal 
agendas can therefore be sold to the nation as being 
in the public interest. According to Prowse and Grassin 
(2020), there is little evidence that groups in Malawian 
society based on class have managed to compete for 
resources, rents, and power. The battle of ideas within 
Malawi often appears to be secondary to material 
concerns. 
It is within this context that the political economy of 
the groundnut value chain is analysed. The World Bank 
(2018), sums up the context perfectly: Malawi’s policy 
arena is shaped by its unique combination of structural 
conditions, historical legacies, and the evolution of 
its political settlement. This political settlement is 
characterised by an elite bargain that allows competition 
among a small elite while providing stable benefits to 
them; fragmentation along identity lines; high donor 
dependence; and a limited social contract based on 
food security, and maize, in particular (Cammack, 
Kelsall and Booth 2018). These characteristics have 
contributed to a stable, but low-level equilibrium, 
trapping the country in a cycle of crises, followed by 
reactive responses, rather than facilitating the deeper 
commitment needed to break out of the cycle. Where 
reform efforts have had traction, elite incentives have 
been aligned due to either being in a vulnerable 
political position and therefore the need to shore up 
support through performance, or because of the need 
to address a threatening economic crisis and reinstate 
donor aid.
There are, however, some prospects for fundamental 
change in the configuration of the country’s political 
settlement, following the Fresh Presidential Elections 
(FPEs) on June 23 2020, which ushered in a new 
coalition government under the leadership of Dr 
Lazarus Chakwera (Chinsinga and Mihowa 2020). The 
FPEs were held under the majoritarian electoral system 
3 Corruption is defined as a form of dishonesty or criminal offence undertaken by a person or organisation entrusted with a position 
of authority to acquire illicit benefit or abuse of power for one’s private gain, while clientelism is a practice of allocating private 
goods, such as jobs or other opportunities, by a patron to his or her clients with an expected return of favours that reinforces 
patronage. This implies that clientelism is the selective provision of benefits and resources to limited segments of the population. 
Patronage, therefore, refers to the control or power to make or grant favours to followers or supporters on the basis of largely political 
considerations (see, for example, de Sardan 1999).
for the first time since the transition to multi-party 
democracy in May 1994, following the courts’ direction 
as part of the remedies to the nullification of the disputed 
elections on 21 May 2019. As a result of the courts’ 
reinterpretation of Section 80 (2) of the Constitution, 
the President is now required to be elected by 50 per 
cent plus one of voters at the polls. This dramatically 
changes the calculus for aspiring candidates to 
become President of the country. They would have to 
invest in broad based national coalitions, which may 
make the provision of public goods an attractive option 
for appealing to potential voters and even as a strategy 
for maintaining power. The new government ascended 
to power on a platform of creating a new Malawi that 
provides access to public goods and resources on an 
equitable basis. This is, inter alia, reflected in the far-
reaching public sector reforms that the government is 
implementing, but it is too early to judge their potential 
impact.
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There are different types of value chain, which include 
a wide range of activities. Prowse and Grassin (2020), 
for example, distinguish five different value chains, 
depending on how power is exerted in the chain. 
The way in which power is exercised in a value chain 
is dependent on the complexity of transactions; the 
ability of actors to access and interpret information; and 
supplier capability. According to Prowse and Grassin 
(2020), the five different types of value chain include 
global, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchical; 
each with different governance implications. There 
are, however, some key elements of agricultural value 
chains. These may include the following: development 
and dissemination of plant and animal genetic material, 
input supply, farmer organisation, farm production, 
post-harvest handling, the provision of production 
techniques, handling and grading criteria and facilities, 
cooling and packaging technologies, local post-
harvest processing, industrial processing, storage, 
transport, and feedback from markets (Norton 2014). 
A value chain approach to agricultural development 
helps to identify weak points in the chain and actions 
to remedy them.
The major distinctive feature of agriculture in developing 
countries is that it is often characterised by dual value 
chains operating in parallel for the same product: one 
formal and the other informal. Norton (2014) observes 
that smallholders are frequently involved in informal 
chains that deliver products to local middlemen and then 
to small local stores. Formal value chains can deliver 
the same product, usually in better or more uniform 
quality, from large farms or more organised groups 
of small farmers to more commercial wholesalers 
and from there to supermarkets or exporters. This 
duality has been accentuated by the explosive growth 
of supermarkets in developing countries. It can limit 
many small producers to markets characterised by low 
quality products and low returns. The issue therefore 
becomes how to find ways to integrate small producers 
into more modern value chains, both domestically and 
export oriented.
3.2 The importance of groundnuts
 
Groundnuts are widely acknowledged as the most 
important legume crop in Malawi, both in terms of 
production area and volume (Itai 2020; Mgalamadzi 
2018). It is predominantly grown by about 100,000 
smallholder farmers in the country. Smallholder farmers 
account for as much as 93 per cent of total groundnut 
production in Malawi, while the remainder is produced 
by estates. While groundnuts can and do generally well 
across the country, the central region dominates in the 
production of groundnuts, particularly in the districts 
of Dedza, Dowa, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Mchinji, Ntchisi, 
and Salima (NASFAM 2013; Simtowe et al. 2009). 
Groundnuts play a key role in the country’s national 
and household economies. As one of the key staples, 
groundnuts provide a vital source of nutrition, especially 
for rural households (Inclusive Business Action Network 
2020). It is a very important component of households’ 
diet through its provision of valuable protein, edible 
oil, fats, energy, minerals, and vitamins. It plays a key 
role in farming, especially for resource constrained 
households, who cannot afford fertiliser. Groundnuts 
can be used for making livestock feed, which 
enhances livestock productivity, thereby enhancing 
the resilience of households against poverty. Last but 
not least, groundnuts are one of the country’s sources 
of foreign exchange, which contributes to the growth 
and resilience of the economy. At the household level, 
it is estimated that groundnuts contribute about 25 per 
cent of total income (Cook et al. 2014; NASFAM 2013; 
Simtowe et al. 2009). 
3.3 The status of the groundnut 
value chain
 
The groundnut value chain in Malawi has evolved 
significantly since the turn of the 1990s. There is, 
however, a single major policy event that accounts 
for most of the changes that have taken place and 
continue to take place in the groundnut value chain. 
The introduction of SAPs in the agricultural sector at 
the instigation of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) prompted changes, which, as 
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further elaborated below, have altered the groundnut 
value chain. In addition, some of the changes that 
have occurred are in response to the challenges that 
arose as a result of the implementation of the SAP 
policy prescriptions. Figure 3.1 represents the status 
quo of the groundnut value chain in Malawi since the 
introduction of SAPs.
Table 3.1 describes the roles of the various players in the 
groundnut value chain. This helps to set the stage for 
understanding how the development of the groundnut 
value chain has been influenced by the implementation 
of and response to the challenges arising out of the 
SAP policy prescriptions (Farm Radio International 
2013; NASFAM 2013; Simtowe et al. 2009).
3.3.1 Production and export trends in the 
groundnut value chain 
Although these stakeholders do not map out exactly to 
those in Figure 3.1, Table 3.1 provides a clear picture of 
the key stakeholders and their roles in the groundnut 
value chain. The interactions, engagements, and 
contestations between and among these stakeholders 
are key to understanding the groundnut value chain, 
both from a contemporary and historical perspective.
3.3.1 Production and export trends in the 
groundnut value chain
Despite its apparent importance in the country’s 
economy, the performance of the groundnut value 
chain has been somewhat mixed. As Figure 3.2 
demonstrates, production has fluctuated wildly, while 
exports almost completely collapsed, especially at the 
turn of the 1990s. However, there are some promising 
signs of recovery in recent years. 
There have been several commentaries on the trends in 
production and export of groundnuts in Malawi. Matita 
(2018) observes that groundnut production was at its 
peak in the 1970s, when it constituted the third largest 
export crop. As shown in Figure 3.2, the production of 
groundnuts collapsed at the turn of the 1990s and, at 
the same time, the export market almost disappeared. 
There has been some recovery, especially since the 
late 1990s. Overall, however, groundnut production 
has not increased fast enough to recover to the pre-
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• Constitute the biggest and most important group in the chain.
• Comprise of women (in male headed households and female headed households), men, and youth, who are 
either rural or urban based, and both better off and poor households. 
• Major producers of groundnuts, but since they are not often well organised their participation in the value chain 
is limited.
• Organisations such as the National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM) and One Village 
One Product work with smallholder farmers to organise them into associations or cooperatives.
Seed companies • Examples include SeedCo Malawi, Demeter, Pannar, Farmers World, NASFAM etc.
• Engaged in seed multiplication (mostly urban based weekend farmers) from both global and national research 
centres.
• Subcontract individual farmers and companies to multiply their groundnut seed.
• Availability of seed, especially to most rural farmers, is a very big challenge.
Agro-dealers • Serving as a source of inputs to farmers including groundnut seed.
• Filling the gap left by the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), especially in rural 
areas.
• Most agro-dealers, however, prefer operating in areas with easy access and good infrastructural networks, 





• Produces or multiplies groundnut seed on contracts for seed companies.
• Requires membership for all participants, which excludes the poorest smallholder farmers.
Intermediate 
buyers and small 
traders
• Driven by the desire to make money before smallholder farmers take their groundnuts to big markets or buyers 
(includes men and women mostly from urban areas).
• Target farmers at the beginning of the harvesting season when they are desperate for quick cash.
• First customers of the smallholder farmers, who then sell to larger traders at a slightly higher price.
• Sometimes subcontracted by big buyers to buy on their behalf, getting commission from their work.
• Intermediate buyers set prices for the vendors and in order to maximise their gains, vendors deflate prices so 
as to make a profit.
• Intermediate buyers buy relatively large quantities of groundnuts compared to vendors.
Processors and 
exporters
• Examples include organisations and companies such as NASFAM, Mulli Brothers Limited, Tambala Food 
Products, Export and Trading Company, Rab Processors and some individuals from both within and outside 
the country.
• Buy groundnuts from traders, add value, and export.
• Often fail to meet export demands due to low production and high levels of aflatoxin, which also affects the 
production of oil and other products.
Consumers • Consume groundnuts and groundnut-based confectionaries, which, inter alia, include peanut butter and nuts 
that are available in retail supermarkets and other grocery stores.
• Some of the shelled groundnuts are exported to regional markets, including Kenya, South Africa, and 
Tanzania.
• A consumer association exists, but focuses on matters affecting mostly urban dwellers, for example, water, 




• Key players include the Department of Agriculture Research, Bunda College of Agriculture and the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
• Interested mainly in improving production and productivity through research and training.
• Conduct and set the policy research and training agenda for quality improvement.
• Grapple with limited human and financial resources to conduct responsive research and training based on the 
needs of smallholder farmers.







• Interested in ensuring that smallholder farmers are effectively participating in the groundnut value chain.
• Keen on improving smallholder farmers’ livelihoods by diversifying their crops, increasing their household 
income base, and mitigating the impact of climate change.
• Make seed available to farmers at affordable prices through various seed schemes.




• Examples include Concern Universal Microfinance Operations, Foundation for International Community 
Assistance, Malawi Union of Savings Credit Cooperatives, Micro-loan Finance etc.
• Extend credit to farmers, but most farmers have not benefited from them because they charge high interest 
rates.




• Comprise of both men and women, but predominantly men, and based either in urban areas or in trading 
centres.
• Sometimes buy groundnuts in their own right or are sub-contracted by intermediate buyers.
• Although they create a market for desperate smallholder farmers, they often buy groundnuts at depressed 
prices to extend their profit margins.
• Serve as the only marketing outlet for farmers especially in remote areas.
Government • Set policies and provide the overall framework for the value chain players and actors to operate.
• The most relevant ministries include the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, 
the Ministry of Gender, and the Ministry of Local Government.
• Run programmes and projects such as FISP, now the Affordable Input Programme, and Rural Livelihood and 
Economic Enhancement Programme, which provide farmers with access to groundnut seed.
• Some of the projects focus on groundnut value chain development through productivity enhancement and 
commercialisation.
Donors • Donors include USAID, Norway, and Irish Aid. These donors have mostly supported the development of the 
groundnut seed system, particularly in the development of breeders’ and basic seed.
• Supported the development of several groundnut varieties, but most of these are yet to be released to farmers 
due to funding constraints.
• Work through ICRISAT and the Department of Agricultural Services of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Source: Authors’ own (2020)
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1990 levels. UNIDO (2012), for instance, estimates 
that between 1961 and 2005, the amount of land 
under groundnut cultivation in Malawi increased from 
159,000ha to almost 267,000ha, representing an 
average annual growth rate of 3.4 per cent. NASFAM 
(2013) emphasises that the growth has been quite 
variable with only 50,000ha cultivated in 1990.
The dramatic decline in groundnut production in 1990 
is attributed to the collapse of exports in 1989. Malawi’s 
groundnut export fell from 30t in 1988 to zero in 1989 
due to the detection of high aflatoxin levels when the 
groundnuts landed in the United Kingdom (UK) (UNIDO 
2012). As can be seen from Figure 3.2, groundnut 
exports remained low after 1990, but appear to make 
a recovery in 2004 when exports increased to 8.6 per 
cent. The performance of the groundnut value chain 
has never recovered to the pre-1990 levels, except in 
2011, when groundnut exports shot to about 90,000t. 
Similarly to production levels, the export performance 
has been quite variable. For example, exports fell to 
2.4t in 2005 and picked up to 3.8t in 2006. Exports 
then increased to 16.9t in 2007, decreased to 14.3t in 
2008, and increased to 19.9t in 2009.
Simtowe et al. (2009) observe that Malawi was ranked 
as the thirteenth largest producer of groundnuts in 
Africa for the period 2001–2006. They estimated that, 
during this period, Malawi produced an average of 
157,000t of groundnuts per year, which accounted for 2 
per cent of total production in Africa. While production 
of groundnuts appears to have recovered, exports 
remain very low. The land cultivated for groundnut 
production has steadily increased since 1990, such 
that, by 2006 it had again reached the 1980 hectarage. 
However, groundnut exports remain below its peak in 
the 1980s, at about 50,000t per annum. According to 
Farm Radio International (2013), about 60 per cent of 
all groundnuts produced in Malawi are consumed at 
household level or sold in local markets. The other 40 
per cent go to processors, exporters, wholesalers, and 
retail markets. Of this, 25 per cent are sold in Malawi 
and exported to countries such as Kenya, South Africa, 
Tanzania and the UK. The remainder is sold through 
informal export trade.
The key question becomes: what explains this 
fluctuating performance of the groundnut value chain 
in Malawi for the past four decades, or so? The rest of 
this section therefore discusses some of the factors that 
shed light on the production and export performance 
of the groundnut value chain in Malawi.
4  Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of ADMARC, 21 July 2020
3.3.1.1 The collapse of ADMARC
The impact of SAPs is probably felt the most through 
the fate of ADMARC, which prior to the roll out of SAPs, 
provided production and export support infrastructure 
for groundnuts (Scott and Chinsinga 2018). As a 
crop marketing board, ADMARC provided farmers 
with ready markets and guaranteed prices for their 
produce. In addition, ADMARC provided farmers with 
required inputs, such as quality seed and pesticides, 
and was supported by a robust Ministry of Agriculture 
extension system, which used to provide technical 
advice and support to smallholder farmers (NASFAM 
2013). The adoption of SAPs weakened the capacity 
of ADMARC to buy and export groundnuts, as well as 
provide requisite extension services.
The collapse of ADMARC has had several impacts on 
the performance of the groundnut value chain in terms 
of production and export. As elaborated further below, 
the streamlining of ADMARC’s network has created 
considerable marketing challenges for groundnuts. 
Most smallholder farmers now rely on vendors to 
sell their groundnuts, usually at exploitative prices 
(Matita 2018; Mgalamadzi 2018). Agro-dealers, who 
have emerged to fill the vacuum left by the rollback 
of ADMARC’s network, prefer to operate in areas 
with easy access and good infrastructural networks, 
leaving out the remotest areas of the country (NASFAM 
2013; Chinsinga 2011). While marketing boards 
generally have a bad reputation across the continent, 
there is palpable nostalgia for ADMARC because the 
alternative marketing outlets have proven even worse. 
Most private traders limit their services to trading 
centres, which are along main roads, yet Malawi is 
predominantly rural, making it difficult for farmers to 
sell their produce. ADMARC had a network of markets 
across rural areas; their markets opened on time and 
offered better and stable prices. As a result, there are 
always calls by farmers for ADMARC to return to its 
pre-SAP modus operandi.
Farmers find it very difficult to access improved seed, 
which is vital to increasing productivity of groundnuts. 
With ADMARC out of the scene, or playing a much more 
diminished role, farmers have to find alternative means 
to get quality improved seed (Nyondo, Nankhuni and 
Me-ksope 2018). Most farmers ‘cannot afford improved 
quality groundnut seed because it is very expensive; it 
costs MK1,500 per kg which is equivalent to US$2, yet 
a hectare requires about 90kg of seed, and besides, 
groundnuts have low seed multiplication ratio’.4 A 
comparison with pigeon peas is quite revealing. The 
seed rate of groundnuts is at least 10 times more than 
that of pigeon peas, while the multiplication ratio is 
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at least four times lower. While farmers require 80–
100kg of seed per ha for groundnuts, they require 
only 10kg/ha for pigeon peas (Nyondo, Nankhuni 
and Me-ksope 2018). The majority of smallholder 
farmers are unable to economically access adequate 
quantities of certified groundnut seed and the private 
sector has found it difficult to develop a commercially 
viable seed market for groundnuts.
Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira and Siambi (2012) estimate 
that only 40 per cent of the total harvested groundnut 
area was covered by improved groundnut varieties. 
This partly explains the failure of groundnut farmers 
to realise the full yield potential for the groundnut 
varieties that they cultivate. For instance, Farm Radio 
International (2013) estimate that farmers get average 
yields of 1,000kg/ha (for CG7 and Nsinjiro varieties) 
and 600kg/ha for the Chalimbana variety. Yet there 
is potential for much larger yields through the use 
of improved seed coupled with good management 
practices. The maximum potential yield for CG7 is 
2,500kg/ha, 2,000kg/ha for Nsinjiro, and 1,500kg/ha 
for Chalimbana. One of the interviewees argued that, 
‘we cannot realise these yield potentials because 
our farmers cannot access improved groundnut 
seed, but even more critically, we are still deeply 
wedded to backward technology, for example, 
planting groundnuts on ridges’.5 Improved quality 
groundnut seed is simply not available in the right 
quantities to meet the farmers’ demand. Subsidy 
programmes such as FISP have not been able to 
mobilise adequate seed for distribution to farmers, 
‘simply because the seed is not there and as such 
farmers simply resort to using recycled seed’.6 This 
assertion is reinforced by Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira, 
and Siambi (2012), who assert that there is simply 
an absence of a stable and commercially viable 
groundnut seed market, hence farmers recycle grain 
and use it as seed.
NGOs have attempted to address the limited 
availability of quality groundnut seed. These efforts 
have included providing farmers with quality 
groundnut seed for multiplication. When farmers 
receive say 50kg of groundnut seed, they pay back 
the NGOs 100kg of groundnuts, which are shared 
with other farmers for at least three years before the 
seed loses its production vigour (Itai 2020; NASFAM 
2013). The impact of these initiatives has been very 
limited and because of their project oriented nature, 
which means that farmers continue to use the seed 
for more than three years. Using the seed for more 
5 Ibid.
6 Interview with a former NASFAM official, 28 July 2020
7 Interview with the Country Director of ICRISAT, 27 October 2019
8 Interview with the Programme Manager of ICRISAT, 27 October 2019
than three years weakens its productive vigour, 
which translates into low yields. Seed companies are 
reluctant to engage in the groundnut seed system 
since farmers can recycle seed without experiencing 
significant yield reductions for at least three years. 
Seed companies, especially international ones, 
find the groundnut seed system less attractive 
for massive investment. These companies focus 
disproportionately on the production and marketing 
of hybrid maize seed due to its high excludability 
and, hence, high profitability (Simtowe, Longwe-
Ngwira and Siambi 2012).
There is an opportunity for local seed companies 
to drive the development of the groundnut seed 
system, but there is limited public and private sector 
investment to spur its growth and development. 
Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira, and Siambi (2012) 
observe that the government has not really prioritised 
the groundnut value chain, in terms of research and 
development aimed at enhancing the transformation 
of the groundnut sector in Malawi. Compared 
to other crops, such as maize and tobacco, the 
public sector investment in groundnut research and 
development initiatives has been quite negligible. In 
fact, nearly all research and development initiatives 
in the groundnut sector have been driven almost 
exclusively by donors through CGIAR centres, 
notably ICRISAT.
USAID has been the major donor driving research 
and development activities in the groundnut sector. 
USAID’s support to research and development 
efforts for the groundnut sector dates back to 2008 
and ‘coincided with the country’s efforts to diversify 
its export portfolio away from tobacco within the 
framework of the FISP’.7 The main goal of this 
support was to make adequate groundnut seed 
available to farmers to facilitate trade in groundnuts 
as a meaningful alternative to tobacco exports. Since 
2015, Irish Aid has joined USAID to support research 
and development activities in the groundnut sector 
with ‘particular focus on enabling farmers to get 
access to the improved seed that comes through the 
research and development activities at ICRISAT’.8 It 
is now estimated that the system is able to make as 
much as 30,000t of groundnut seed available to the 
farming community.
Through this support, ICRISAT has produced several 
varieties of groundnuts since 2008. While some of 
these varieties have been released to farmers, many 
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more are yet to be released. Those that have been 
released to farmers include Nsinjiro and Kakoma, 
and those yet to be released include Baka, modelled 
on South Africa’s Natal Common, CG8, CG9, CG10, 
CG11, CG12, CG13, and CG14. While Nsinjiro and 
Kakoma are highly productive, they have challenges 
that make them less attractive to farmers. Nsinjiro has 
hard pods that make shelling difficult, while Kakoma is 
highly susceptible to rosette disease. Moreover, these 
varieties have struggled to break into the export market, 
‘which… [encourages] farmers to continue producing 
Chalimbana and CG7’.9 This is despite the fact that 
these varieties ‘are not very productive, and the huge 
kernels for Chalimbana and high oil content (48–50 per 
cent) of CG7, make them less attractive for exports’.10 
The major constraint, however, to making the improved 
seed varieties available to farmers is the lack of funding 
to facilitate the multiplication of these new varieties on a 
scale adequate to facilitate meaningful cultivation: ‘we 
have developed these promising varieties, but they are 
yet to be released to farmers because we lack funding 
for the last mile for these varieties to reach farmers’.11 
According to UNIDO (2012), ICRISAT has prioritised the 
provision of breeder and basic seed for groundnuts. 
It is estimated that ICRISAT produced 146t of basic 
seed and 25t of breeder seed between 1999 and 
2006, which partly accounted for the recovery in both 
production and export performance of the groundnuts, 
as depicted in Figure 3.2.
3.3.1.2 Deficient capacity to control 
aflatoxin levels
The collapse of Malawi’s groundnut exports, especially 
to Europe at the turn of the 1990s, is attributed to the 
failure to meet stringent quality measures imposed 
by the European Union (EU) to counter aflatoxin 
contamination (Nyondo, Nankhuni and Me-ksope 
2018; Simtowe et al. 2009). Aflatoxin is produced by 
a fungus that grows on crops as a result of poor pre- 
and post-harvest practices. Inclusive Business Action 
Network (2020) estimates that trade losses attributed 
to aflatoxin contamination are US$1.2 billion globally 
and US$450 million in Africa.
Aflatoxin has become an issue in the local and 
export trade of groundnut because it is a health 
hazard. According to Farm Radio International (2013), 
groundnuts contaminated with aflatoxin are poisonous 
to people, causing liver cancer and stunting in young 
children. The EU, which was a major export destination 
for Malawi’s groundnuts, set a maximum tolerable limit 
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Interview with the Country Director of ICRISAT, 27 October 2019
of aflatoxin contamination of 4 parts per billion (ppb). 
The EU discontinued importing groundnuts from 
Malawi at the turn of the 1990s when assessments 
indicated that aflatoxin levels in Malawi’s groundnuts 
exceeded 20ppb (Simtowe et al. 2009). With these 
high levels of aflatoxin contamination, Malawi is paying 
a huge health cost. Studies show that since 2000, 
6,344 deaths annually can be attributed to aflatoxin 
induced liver cancer. These deaths are estimated to 
cost Malawi’s economy between US$25 million and 
US$1.3 billion annually (excluding costs associated 
with lost export markets) (Nyondo, Nankhuni and Me-
ksope 2018). 
The worsening levels of aflatoxin in Malawi groundnuts 
coincided with the diminished role of ADMARC in the 
groundnut export trade, following the adoption of SAP 
policy prescriptions. Prior to the introduction of SAPs, 
ADMARC played a key role in the provision of extension 
services, which ensured proper handling of all pre- and 
post-harvest processes. These extension services 
helped to control the levels of contamination and 
facilitated meticulous grading of groundnuts. ADMARC 
could only buy groundnuts from smallholder farmers 
that were properly graded. ADMARC also had a facility 
at Liwonde to check for aflatoxin contamination levels 
and it only exported high quality groundnuts. The 
following sentiments of some of the key stakeholders 
are illustrative of the key role ADMARC played in the 
groundnut export trade:
Farmers have not been interested in grading 
their groundnuts as… [previously] ADMARC 
commanded almost singlehandedly the entire 
groundnut value chain. Vendors, as well as 
companies that farmers sell their groundnuts 
to, do not demand grading at all. They do 
the grading themselves, a practice that has 
spilled [over] to other crops such as tobacco, 
in which handling processes increase chances 
of groundnuts getting contaminated with 
aflatoxin. There is a lot of cheating, essentially, 
poor management of the value chain. (Interview 
with a Chief Executive Officer of a farmer 
organisation, 16 July 2020)
Grading of groundnuts and its proper handling 
was a must… farmers had to meticulously 
grade their groundnuts before taking it to the 
ADMARC market. Today, the groundnuts 
are carelessly handled, different grades [are] 
mixed, and farmers include rotten groundnuts 
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to enhance volume, thereby increasing chances 
for contamination with aflatoxin. (Interview with 
a former official of NASFAM, 28 July 2020)
Liberalisation spoilt groundnut trade. The 
coming in of vendors and the rollback of 
ADMARC has destroyed groundnut farming. 
Vendors do not care about quality; they 
purchase whatever they get from farmers, yet 
previously ADMARC could only buy groundnuts 
from farmers that were properly graded. 
This practice has resulted in farmers selling 
groundnuts that are not properly processed 
and increases chances of contamination with 
aflatoxin. A question that I have is where do 
these vendors sell this poor quality groundnuts 
and what do the buyers do with it? (Interview 
with the President of the Farmers Union of 
Malawi [FUM], 24 July 2020)
According to Cook et al. (2014), aflatoxin levels rise due 
to poor drying practices, when water is used to soften 
shells, or when contaminated nuts are mixed with 
uncontaminated nuts. While aflatoxin contamination 
is an issue at both pre- and post-harvest stages in 
the value chain, NASFAM (2013) state that most of 
the post-harvest handling processes greatly enhance 
the chances of groundnuts becoming contaminated. 
Some of the constraints associated with poor post-
harvest handling processes include: the continued 
use of traditional methods of harvesting; limited 
knowledge in groundnut grading and value addition; 
shelling methods, such as the use of water during 
shelling, which render nuts susceptible to aflatoxin 
contamination; the use of unimproved storage facilities 
that increase the chances of post-harvest losses from 
pest and disease outbreaks; and limited knowledge of 
proper groundnut handling during drying and shelling. 
Aflatoxin contamination still remains a huge barrier to 
Malawi’s groundnut export recovery to levels that rival 
the peak in the 1970s and 1980s, despite concerted 
efforts to increase trade (Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira 
and Siambi 2012). Both modern and traditional means 
have been deployed to limit aflatoxin contamination, but 
they have not yet yielded the desired results. The most 
credible means to detect and control aflatoxin levels 
is very expensive. This high liquid chromatography 
method costs around US$230 per sample assessed, 
which is very expensive for the majority of farmers 
in Malawi. The alternative method, which is used in 
Malawi, is fairly affordable to farmers at about US$1. 
However, this does not significantly promote the 
competitiveness of groundnut exports because it does 
12 Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of ADMARC, 21 July 2020
not fully detect levels of aflatoxin contamination. This 
method is called the enzyme linked immunosorbent 
assay, which has been used by NASFAM and ICRISAT, 
but these organisations still send groundnut samples to 
accredited laboratories in South Africa to enhance the 
reliability of the decisions made. ICSRISAT established 
the Malawi Programme for Aflatoxin Control (MAPAC) 
in 2015 to ensure an integrated, nationwide approach 
to the problem (Dzanja, Kamkwamba and Matita 2017). 
With the scaled down involvement of ADMARC in the 
groundnut value chain, MAPAC has been the only 
nationwide initiative to control aflatoxin contamination 
in groundnuts. These efforts to develop the capacity 
to detect and control aflatoxin to acceptable levels 
continue with the aim to make Malawi’s groundnut 
exports competitive. However, most of the interventions 
have either been project or programme oriented and, 
as such, they have failed to deliver the desired strategic 
impact. 
The most notable traditional means to limit aflatoxin 
contamination that has been developed and encouraged 
among smallholder farmers is the Mandela Cock. 
The interviewees indicated that this method involves 
stacking groundnuts in a circle with pods pointing to 
the centre, while leaving a hole in the middle. This is 
mostly done in the field, where the groundnuts are left 
to dry slowly for 3–4 weeks. The Mandela Cock drying 
method for groundnuts reportedly gets rid of about 80 
per cent of aflatoxin, especially since it allows for the 
nuts to dry slowly, which reduces their susceptibility 
to aflatoxin contamination. While this method is 
reasonably effective, ‘it is, however, not widely used by 
farmers because most farmers who have used it have 
often experienced massive theft of their groundnuts… 
with rural livelihoods getting very tough petty theft is 
rapidly emerging as one of the most common survival 
strategies’.12
3.3.1.3 Marketing challenges and 
constraints
There are various forms of groundnut marketing 
outlets. These include, small aggregators, who 
buy from villages and sell to big vendors with 
warehouses; middlemen, who often operate at 
main market locations within trading centres or in a 
district’s business area; big companies, which buy 
from middlemen; local cooperatives, which buy from 
members and non-members; and NGOs, which often 
buy from smallholder farmers that they have supported 
with seed (Itai 2020; Matita 2018). The major market 
for groundnuts produced by smallholder farmers is 
vendors. Scott and Chinsinga (2018) observe that 
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smallholder farmers in Malawi lack access to lucrative, 
structured, and predictable markets, locally and 
internationally, following the collapse of ADMARC as 
the major marketing outlet for groundnuts. ADMARC 
was exporting groundnuts which it bought from the 
farmers. Depending on the nature of the export market, 
‘ADMARC was offering farmers bonuses for each kg of 
groundnuts sold to it that had been exported… this 
was called “champini” meaning “for the hoe handle” 
which could between MK1 and MK10’.13 This motivated 
farmers to step up production because ‘the bonus that 
we are talking about gave farmers an additional injection 
of cash that proved handy for them to procure inputs, 
especially fertiliser, for the next farming season’.14
While middlemen play a critical role in providing markets 
to desperate farmers, the market leaves a lot to be 
desired. As already observed, middlemen offer very 
low prices and often tamper with weighing scales. In 
the Malawi context, without middlemen, farmers would 
not be able to access cash, especially in the remotest 
areas, which is vital for them to meet some of their 
day-to-day needs. In addition, the middlemen create 
employment, especially among rural youth, who serve 
as their buying agents. These agents get a very low 
commission, but it helps them to survive. Middlemen 
continue to thrive because efforts to establish 
cooperatives in these remote areas, to facilitate bulk 
marketing and bargaining for better prices, have failed 
(Chimombo 2018). Middlemen need to be nurtured so 
that they can provide the missing market, but in a way 
that at least allows farmers to meet their production 
costs, as well as make a reasonable profit to sustain 
farming as their principal means of livelihood. 
The disappearance of lucrative and predictable 
markets has greatly contributed to the apparent low 
productivity of groundnuts in the country. The dominant 
groundnut market offered by vendors is characterised 
by a great deal of price fluctuations, which affect 
farmers’ decisions and marketing behaviour. There are 
two further challenges associated with this particular 
market. Vendors often offer very low prices, which 
are sometimes far below the minimum prices set by 
the government. They are also known for tampering 
with measuring scales to exploit farmers. In addition, 
vendors tend to start buying groundnuts too early in 
the season, often in April, which raises food safety 
issues related to aflatoxin levels in food consumption 
(Matita 2018; Mgalamadzi 2018).
13 Interview with one of the big local traders, 12 August 2020
14 Ibid.
15 Interview with the President of FUM, 24 July 2020
16 Interview with the Chief Executive of a farmers’ organisation, 19 July 2020
Alternative markets provided by NGOs and 
cooperatives are not deemed profitable either. Itai 
(2020) indicated that some farmers are engaged in 
some form of contract farming with NGOs, where 
they are expected to sell their groundnuts only to 
the NGOs that provided them with seed. Farmers’ 
complaint is that this arrangement limits their market 
value and opportunities. The main thrust of the 
farmers’ sentiments, according to Itai (2020), is that, 
‘these NGOs bring seed to us when we have nothing 
to plant in our fields… and for us to… [receive the] 
same assistance the following farming season we are 
obliged to sell to them as per our agreement, although 
we do not benefit much’.
3.3.1.4 Productivity constraints
There are several factors that have combined to 
constrain the productivity of groundnuts in the 
country. Firstly, climate change poses challenges to 
the productivity of many crops including groundnuts. 
The productivity of groundnuts is negatively affected 
due to erratic rainfall and dry spells, especially during 
critical periods of growth and development (FARA, ZEF 
and AICC 2015; NASFAM 2013). The main challenge 
is that groundnuts are cultivated entirely as a rain-fed 
crop. There are some farmers that grow groundnuts 
in wetlands, especially in Mchinji, ‘but they have not 
been encouraged and supported by extension efforts 
to popularise this as an alternative means of growing 
groundnuts’.15 While climate smart agriculture is 
widely practiced for other crops, especially maize, not 
many farmers do it for groundnuts. ‘This is down to 
conflicting message[s] about climate smart agriculture, 
which makes it difficult for it to achieve the desired 
strategic impact’.16 
Secondly, many farmers are reluctant to cultivate 
groundnuts on an extensive scale because it is a 
labour intensive crop. It competes for labour with other 
crops, especially tobacco and maize, hence, many 
farmers rarely cultivate more than 0.5ha of groundnuts. 
Investment in groundnuts on a larger scale can only be 
promoted through mechanisation at different stages of 
the groundnut production cycle. Mechanisation in the 
harvesting and shelling of groundnuts can greatly help 
to boost investment in groundnuts. These two tasks 
are disliked by farmers and limit their investment in 
groundnut production because they are quite labour 
intensive. They require heavy labour commitments, 
‘which most farmers do not regard as [a] worthwhile 
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opportunity cost… this is why ADMARC is considering 
investing in shelling technology so as to attract more 
farmers to engage in groundnut production’.17 
Thirdly, there are limited credit facilities that support 
farmers to cultivate groundnuts, especially on a larger 
scale. Since the implementation of SAPs, the country 
has struggled to put in place viable credit facilities to 
support farmers in the agricultural sector. Access to 
improved seed and related inputs is very challenging, 
since ADMARC wound up the Smallholder Agriculture 
Credit Administration in 1994. The alternatives that 
have emerged are ‘not farmer friendly because 
they levy very high interests that make farming less 
profitable and attractive as a principal means of 
livelihoods’.18 The underlying argument is that, ‘without 
viable credit support facilities, people in rural areas 
cannot afford to invest in groundnuts on a larger scale 
because groundnut is a seed intensive crop, yet it is 
very expensive’.19
Although groundnuts are showing recovery signs in 
terms of productivity, production levels remain very 
low. The production of groundnuts has, thus, not kept 
up with the demands of both local and export markets 
in terms of volume (Matita 2018; Mgalamadzi 2018; 
NASFAM 2013). In summary, the low productivity of 
groundnuts is attributed to reliance on small-scale 
traditional groundnut farming husbandry practices; 
poor access to improved seed materials, resulting in 
recycling of planting materials; limited private sector 
involvement in improved groundnut seed multiplication; 
poor crop husbandry practices, resulting in declining 
soil fertility levels; erratic rainfall and dry spells during 
critical periods of plant development and growth; low 
adoption of improved technologies; and pest and 
diseases (FARA, ZEF and AICC 2015; NASFAM 2013).
17 Ibid.
18 Interview with an official of the Grain Traders Association of Malawi (GTAM), 22 August 2020
19 Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of ADMARC, 21 July 2020
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Several factors have led to the re-emergence and 
recovery of the groundnut value chain. These factors 
either singularly, or in combination, have led to the 
recovery of groundnut production, especially since the 
turn of the 2000s. However, this recovery in production 
has not been matched with an equal recovery in 
exports (Mgalamadzi 2018; Simtowe, Longwe-
Ngwira and Siambi 2012). Formal exports remain 
very low. It is, in fact, estimated that only 1 per cent of 
groundnuts produced in Malawi are exported through 
formal structured markets namely: the Agricultural 
Commodity Exchange (ACE) and the Auction 
Holdings Limited Commodity Exchange (AHCX). Yet, 
it is reported that about 40 per cent of groundnuts 
produced in Malawi are exported within the region and 
even beyond. It is estimated that 60–90 per cent of 
groundnut exports from Malawi are through informal 
markets and largely through unchartered routes. 
One of the major concerns, however, is that there are 
some local processors, especially the manufacturers 
of therapeutic products, who are forced to source 
groundnuts from outside Malawi. This underscores the 
fact that high levels of aflatoxin contamination remain a 
huge barrier for Malawi’s groundnuts to break into the 
orbits of lucrative local, regional, and global markets. 
Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira and Siambi (2012) observe 
that substantial opportunities exist for export to the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and 
the EU, as well as well as to South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe.
Factors that are driving the re-emergence and recovery 
of the groundnut value chain can be distinguished into 
three main categories. These are: 1) the progressive 
decline of tobacco as a major cash crop; 2) NGO and 
donor initiatives to revamp the groundnut sector; and 
3) government policies that have either directly or 
indirectly promoted groundnut production.
4.1 The decline of tobacco
 
Tobacco is the major cash crop for Malawi. It accounts 
for about 63 per cent of total export earnings (FARA, 
ZEF and AICC 2015). This makes Malawi the most 
tobacco dependent country in the world. Smith (2018) 
illustrates the magnitude of Malawi’s dependency 
on tobacco. She estimated that in 2015, tobacco 
comprised 30–40 per cent of total exports, making 
up 11 per cent of the country’s GDP and 60 per cent 
of its export earnings. The paradox, however, is that 
while tobacco is clearly an important source of foreign 
exchange earnings at the national level, most tobacco 
farmers in Malawi live in poverty.
Part of the reason that most farmers do not benefit 
from tobacco farming is the progressive decline that 
the crop has experienced, especially since the turn 
of the 1990s. A combination of factors, such as the 
decline in tobacco quality, a decrease in yields, and 
increased transport, transaction, and marketing 
costs, have progressively decimated the benefits that 
accrue to farmers (Prowse and Grassin 2020). The 
genesis of this decline is attributed to the neoliberal 
policy reforms. Among other things, these reforms 
allowed smallholder farmers to participate in the 
cultivation of tobacco without adequate consideration 
of the institutional framework to prevent this shift from 
compromising the quality of the tobacco leaf offered on 
the market. These reforms were engineered by political 
elites, who did not have huge stakes in the industry, 
but saw these reforms as a means to get quick 
benefits for themselves. The reforms, for instance, 
allowed middlemen without any experience in handling 
tobacco to buy from farmers and sell the tobacco at 
the auction floors. The poor quality of the tobacco led 
to the progressive collapse of the tobacco industry. 
This has left the country with essentially no productive 
sector, especially since the rejection rates for tobacco 
leaf have soared to about 60 per cent in recent growing 
seasons. Moreover, since the 1990s, there have been 
accusations that prices at tobacco auction floors are 
fixed by companies acting like a cartel. A 2016 study 
is quite illustrative in this regard. Only 25 per cent of 
Malawian tobacco farmers were satisfied with the sales 
prices they received in 2014, and approximately 41 per 
cent had considered switching to alternative crops or 
livelihoods (Smith 2018).
The apparent decline of the tobacco industry has 
occurred despite the existence of a regulator, charged 
with the responsibility of overseeing standards in 
the sector. This task is performed by the Tobacco 
Control Commission (TCC). The work of the TCC was 
properly supported and facilitated during the one-party 
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state regime, with the sole purpose of facilitating an 
institutional framework for successful production and 
extraction of rents. However, the situation changed 
quite substantially following the political transition in May 
1994. The political elite that took power were not very 
interested in agriculture as a means of accumulating 
wealth, but rather commerce and industry (Chinsinga 
2002). Their focus therefore shifted away from 
agriculture to commerce and industry, particularly 
through government procurement contracts. The TCC 
was equally captured by the new elite, who used it as 
a tool to neutralise the economic, political, and social 
power of the one-party elites. They did this by pushing 
for institutional reforms to the tobacco industry, which 
ended up compromising safeguards that promoted 
quality standards and professionalism. The institutional 
laxity that followed the capture of the TCC resulted in it 
losing its foothold of the industry and efforts to restore 
standards to the pre-transition period have effectively 
failed.
The decline of the tobacco industry is further attributed 
to the fierce anti-smoking lobby mounted within the 
context of the World Health Organization’s Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FARA, ZEF and AICC 
2015). The anti-smoking lobby is driven by concerns 
about the health risks of smoking. The measures that 
are being promoted, such as raising cigarette taxes, 
bans on cigarette advertising, and the promotion 
of smoking restrictions, have greatly depressed 
global demand for tobacco (FAO). These measures, 
coupled with stringent demands for traceability, have 
forced Malawi to start looking for alternative crops to 
complement and, perhaps, replace tobacco as a major 
foreign exchange earner. It is against this background 
that groundnut production, previously dominated by 
women, is steadily emerging as a potential alternative 
crop. The sentiments of Malawi’s former Minister of 
Finance, Dr Goodall Gondwe, are illustrative in this 
regard: 
There is high demand for legumes on the world 
market and there is [a] stable market for it… 
tobacco has failed us, and legumes production 
is the way to go if we are to improve our socio-
economic standards as farmers and at the 
same time to improve our country’s economy. 
(Mhango 2016)
The move towards legume farming is further bolstered 
by the decision by some tobacco firms to diversify their 
investment portfolio. According to some respondents 
to this study, companies like Limbe Leaf are 
diversifying into the production of legumes, especially 
groundnuts and soya beans, to cushion themselves 
20 Interview with an official of GTAM, 27 August 2020
from the unfavourable tobacco trade. ‘This is creating 
fierce competition with smallholder farmers and, as 
such, there is need for the government to regulate 
their involvement in this sector’.20 There are also non-
tobacco companies that are moving into groundnut 
production on an extensive scale. Exageris is one such 
company, which is aiming to produce about 50,000t 
of groundnuts over the next 10 years, with a particular 
focus on the export market and value addition. This will 
be achieved through the company’s own production on 
about 3,180ha and out-grower scheme arrangements 
with smallholder farmers. Exageris has already started 
production on its estate and is investing in research 
and development. 
We are engaging in [a] variety trials in order to 
come up with groundnuts that will be productive 
in the hands of farmers, since most farmers do 
not realise potential maximum yields because 
they… use poor groundnut seed in the context 
of quite erratic climatic patterns. (Interview with 
the General Manager of Exageris, 30 August 
2020)
4.2 NGO and donor initiatives
 
There are several NGOs and farmers’ organisations 
that have played, and continue to play, a critical role in 
the re-emergence and recovery of the groundnut value 
chain. Notable farmers’ organisations include NASFAM 
and FUM (Cook et al. 2014). These organisations, plus 
other NGOs, have been quite instrumental in mobilising 
farmers into clubs, associations, and cooperatives, 
which promote and market groundnuts, and hence 
contribute to the competitiveness of the crop (Simtowe, 
Longwe-Ngwira and Siambi 2012; Simtowe et al. 
2009). Through concerted work on aflatoxin reduction 
measures with smallholder groundnut farmers, in 
partnership with a Fairtrade organisation, Twin Trading 
Ltd, NASFAM has resurrected the European export 
market. About 4,000 farmers, many of whom are 
women, have been able to better manage production 
and post-harvest handling to reduce aflatoxin to 
acceptable export levels. However, premiums are 
small and the farmers are somewhat discouraged by 
not seeing their income grow as expected (Cook et al. 
2014).
Although NGOs’ and farmer organisations’ efforts to 
support the groundnut value chain have registered 
some success, there is still a very long way to go. 
According to Farm Radio International (2013), most 
small-scale farmers in Malawi are not organised, they 
produce and market their groundnuts individually. It is, 
in fact, estimated that out of the 100,000 groundnut 
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farmers in the country, only 15,000 operate in clubs, 
associations, and cooperatives. This means that as 
high as 85 per cent of groundnut smallholder farmers 
remain unorganised. Unorganised farmers cannot 
fully and effectively participate in the groundnut 
value chain because they lack bargaining power to 
make their participation profitable. Some NGOs have 
contributed to reviving the groundnut value chain by 
making improved seed available to farmers through 
various schemes (Itai 2020). As stated already, the 
major complaint about these schemes is that farmers 
feel that they are sometimes exploited because they 
have to repay huge volumes of groundnuts and they 
are restricted to the markets offered by these NGOs, 
even when alternative lucrative markets exist.
Donors have been instrumental in reviving the 
groundnut value chain in various ways. As already 
indicated, USAID and Irish Aid have been critical to 
improving farmers’ access to improved groundnut 
seed. These donors have invested massively in the 
development of the groundnut seed system in Malawi, 
which has essentially been neglected by the public 
sector (Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira and Siambi 2012). 
To reiterate, the major drawback is that while these 
donors have spearheaded the development of a wide 
variety of groundnut seed through ICRISAT, many of 
these varieties are yet to be released for farmers to use 
due to financial constraints. Consequently, ‘farmers 
still predominantly cultivate Chalimbana, which is out 
of favour in the export markets, and CG7, which is okay 
but highly susceptible to aflatoxin, making it difficult for 
it to fully break into export markets’.21
Recent USAID support has been channelled through 
a project called Feed the Future Malawi: Integrating 
Nutrition in Value Chains (FtF-INVC). This is an integral 
part of the US government’s global initiative to 
sustainably reduce poverty and hunger. One of FtF-
INVC’s initiatives aims to expand access to markets 
for smallholder farmers involved in growing soya beans 
and groundnuts, which are the two key value chain 
crops it is promoting. Since its launch, FtF-INVC has 
been organising buyers’ tours, which have included 
Rab Processors, Estrell Trading Company, Exageris, 
ACE, and Sunseed Oil (Masangati 2016). The purpose 
of these tours is to help the private sector appreciate 
the quality of crop available, while ensuring that farmers 
have the opportunity to negotiate better prices for their 
products. In addition, FtF-INVC promotes, supports, 
and facilitates gender equitable, market driven, 
agriculture led, and integrated economic growth.
The Development Fund of Norway supports the 
Legume Development Trust, which was initially 
21 Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of ADMARC, 21 July 2020
established in 2008 by Malawi’s Research Into Use 
organisation. Known as the Legumes Platform in 2008, 
its main goal was to contribute to overall food and 
nutrition security and income generation in Malawi. 
The Legumes Platform intended to achieve this goal 
through resilient and sustainable seed systems, which 
would spur increased legume productivity at farm 
level, resulting in increased legume use at household 
and industrial levels (UNIDO 2012). The coordination 
of the Legume Development Trust is now handled by 
the African Institute for Corporate Citizenship, which 
has revived it to promote the productivity of legumes 
with a particular focus on groundnuts. The other 
legumes include soya beans and pigeon peas. In its 
reconstituted form, the Trust comprises of consumers, 
policymakers, traders, and financial institutions. It has 
been reorganised into four technical working groups, 
namely: production, marketing, processing and value 
addition, and policy. The main tasks of the Trust 
include the following: promoting an effective legume 
seed supply system; farmers’ empowerment and 
organisational development; promoting technology 
transfer; linking legume farmers to high value markets; 
enhancing farmer productivity; and introducing higher 
valued added activities within the value chain.
4.3 Government policies and 
programmes
 
The government has implemented several policies and 
programmes that have, in different ways, contributed 
to the revival of the groundnut value chain in the 
country (UNCTAD 2019; UNIDO 2012). These policies 
and programmes are essentially designed to support 
the production of high quality groundnuts with lower 
aflatoxin levels. Achieving acceptable aflatoxin levels 
to trade in global markets would enable groundnut 
farmers to enjoy the benefits of high global prices, 
which increased at an average growth rate of 7.2 per 
cent during the period 1991–2006. Most of the policies 
and programmes have been inspired by the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategies (MGDS I, II, and 
III), the country’s five-year mid-term rolling planning 
framework. The agricultural component of the MGDS 
is influenced by and responds to the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). 
The CAADP requires signatory countries to invest at 
least 10 per cent of their national budget in agriculture, 
which leads to an estimated 6 per cent annual growth 
in GDP and improves rural livelihoods. 
It is against this backdrop that MGDS I to III have 
consistently promoted the diversification of agricultural 
production to include high value commodities for 
export, with the aim to promote food security, 
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economic growth, and wealth creation. The Agriculture 
Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp) (2008) was developed 
to achieve these goals. The ASWAp has since evolved 
into the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP), 
which is a medium term investment framework for 
the agricultural sector, covering the period between 
2018 and 2023. Both ASWAp and NAIP recognise 
commercial agriculture, agro-processing, and market 
development as key priority areas that must be 
supported in order to boost the country’s economy 
and increase general levels of prosperity. The NAIP 
continues with the ASWAp’s goal of seeking to increase 
economic returns to smallholder farmers by enabling 
the production of aflatoxin-free groundnuts, which 
could be exported into more lucrative international 
markets (UNCTAD 2019; UNIDO 2012).
Through FISP, the government was able to provide 
beneficiary farmers with improved groundnut seed, 
which progressively improved the productivity 
of groundnuts (NASFAM 2013; UNIDO 2012). 
Implemented initially as an integral part of ASWAp, 
and later NAIP, the decision to include legume seed 
in the FISP package was meant to encourage crop 
diversification to promote better nutrition for farmers, 
improve their soil fertility, and enhance their incomes 
through domestic and export sales. Although farmers’ 
access to improved groundnut seed through FISP was 
somewhat erratic, due to the scarcity of improved seed, 
some farmers received improved seed, who would 
previously have been unable to access it. This greatly 
contributed to the increased groundnut productivity 
that has been observed, especially since 2008.
The implementation of the National Multi-Sector 
Nutrition Policy has further contributed to the recovery 
in groundnut productivity in Malawi. This policy, first 
developed in 2007, aims to improve the nutrition 
status of all Malawians, with an emphasis on children 
under five-years-old, pregnant and lactating women, 
school aged children, and other vulnerable groups, 
such as people living with HIV and people affected 
by emergencies (GoM 2018). As part of the policy’s 
implementation, the government runs a therapeutic 
programme in all government and mission hospitals, 
which involves the provision of groundnut paste, locally 
known as ‘chiponde’, to malnourished children and 
HIV/AIDS infected patients. This groundnut paste is 
mostly sourced from locally owned companies. The 
programme has greatly contributed to the improvement 
in groundnut productivity because it is aligned to 
the government’s goal to transform the groundnut 
subsector from a subsistence oriented sector to a more 
commercially oriented sector. Several organisations 
are therefore implementing innovative arrangements 
to link farmers to markets and to reduce transaction 
costs associated with activities along the supply chain, 
for example, storage, product control, standardisation 
etc. (UNIDO 2012).
Simtowe et al. (2009) highlighted the weather index-
based groundnut insurance scheme as one of the 
most progressive institutional innovations towards the 
promotion of groundnut production in Malawi. This 
was prompted by the worsening climatic conditions, 
which makes farming, especially groundnut farming, 
an extremely risky venture. With technical and financial 
support from the World Bank and Opportunity 
International, in partnership with NASFAM and 
Insurance Association of Malawi, the groundnut 
insurance scheme was initially launched in the districts 
of Kasungu, Lilongwe and Nkhotakota. The insurance 
scheme involves an index-based weather insurance 
contract, which pays out if the rainfall in a season is 
insufficient to support groundnut production. The 
insured crop can then be used by farmers as collateral 
for accessing credit from financial institutions. This 
enables groundnut farmers to purchase and plant 
certified groundnut seed. Using certified seed not only 
increases the farmers’ productivity, but also their ability 
to control aflatoxin contamination in their groundnuts, 
thereby enhancing profits (UNCTAD 2019; UNIDO 
2012).
Last, but not least, the National Export Strategy 
(NES) developed in 2012 has also contributed to the 
increased groundnut productivity. The NES is billed 
as the first coherent and integrated policy framework 
for the export sector. It provides a prioritised roadmap 
for developing the productive base of the economy to 
enable both export competitiveness and the economic 
empowerment of youth, women, smallholder farmers, 
job seekers, and the poor. The NES prioritises legumes, 
such as groundnuts and soya beans, for value addition 
and exports, especially in view of the world’s campaign 
against tobacco production and utilisation (FARA, 
ZEF and AICC 2015; NASFAM 2013). The NES has 
been developed on the premise that groundnut and 
soya bean products are among the products with the 
highest potential for collaboration among stakeholders.
Notwithstanding these initiatives, there are several 
factors elaborated in this paper that constrain 
groundnut production. All these constraints point to 
the fact that some major structural transformations 
are needed to ensure substantial improvements in the 
productivity of Malawi’s agricultural sector. In addition, 
the sector must increase its resilience to climate 
change to boost agricultural economic vitality, with 
a view to fully exploiting both domestic and export 
markets (Simtowe, Longwe-Ngwira and Siambi 2012). 
While formal groundnut exports are still constrained 
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by aflatoxin contamination, the informal export trade, 
explored in detail in the next section, continues to 
flourish. There is a need to explore how high quality 
groundnut production can be promoted, while ensuring 
farmers’ access to lucrative markets both domestically 
and externally. As hinted in the NES, the legume sector 
has the potential to promote sustainable, inclusive 
development in rural Malawi, creating a foundation for 
long-term resilient growth.
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There are two major stories that demonstrate the 
apparent strategic neglect and capture of the 
groundnut value chain. These stories are about the 
enduring contestations to establish export mandates 
for agricultural produce in the country and the 
emergence and entrenchment of the Mgona informal 
groundnut export market right in the heart of the capital 
city, Lilongwe. Mgona is one of the informal settlements 
in the capital city, within a 20km radius from the seat 
of government, Capital Hill. These two stories are a 
great cause for concern because they constitute a 
paradox for Malawi, which is a predominantly agrarian 
economy, yet gets very little taxation proceeds from 
the agricultural sector. An official from one of the 
leading farmers’ organisations observed that, ‘the 
country is losing a lot of money from the agricultural 
sector; tax contribution from the agricultural sector is 
estimated at only 10 per cent, yet this is an agrarian 
economy… this is not surprising because most of 
the transactions are done informally’.22 While the 
agriculture sector contributes about 30 per cent to 
the country’s GDP, employs about 85 per cent of the 
population, and generates about 60 per cent of rural 
income, it rakes in only 10 per cent of the total tax 
revenue. This is predominantly the case because of the 
salience of informal cross border trade (UNCTAD 2019; 
Gondwe and Baulch 2017). Ministry of Trade officials 
estimate that the illicit export of commodities such as 
groundnuts and soya beans, amount to about MK30 
billion annually (The Nation 2020).
There is huge potential for Malawi’s agriculture sector 
to raise substantial additional revenue to government 
coffers through formalised export trade. For example, 
with reference to the groundnut value chain, the 
potential export trade is estimated at US$48.4 million, 
of which 52 per cent or US$25.2 million remains 
unrealised (International Trade Centre 2018). There is 
great potential within the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) region and even beyond, subject 
to the value chain’s ability to decisively deal with 
aflatoxin challenges. Unrealised potential exists in 
traditional SADC markets (South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
and Zambia), as well as in Mozambique, where Malawi 
currently accounts for less than 4 per cent of all 
22 Interview with an official from one of the leading farmers’ organisations, 7 August 2020
groundnut imports. It is estimated that Mozambique 
has an untapped groundnut export market to the tune 
of US$2.2 million. Malawi’s potential to exploit this 
market is hugely dependent on its ability to intensify 
its capacity to effectively compete with South Africa, 
which is currently Mozambique’s biggest supplier 
(International Trade Centre 2018). 
The stories about the contestations regarding the 
establishment of export mandates and the thriving 
Mgona informal groundnut export market, illustrate 
Malawi’s failure to take steps that would enable it to 
enormously benefit from a formalised export trade in 
agricultural commodities. Since the 1960s, the Control 
Goods Act (CGA), which was revised in 2017, has 
regulated the importation and exportation of goods by 
restricting, banning, or allowing exports and imports 
under license. For agriculture based commodities, a 
trader is required to obtain an authorisation letter from 
the Ministry of Agriculture before applying for a license 
from the Ministry of Trade. This means that any trader 
who imports or exports licensable goods without a 
requisite license commits an offence punishable by law. 
Export mandates cannot be implemented due to fierce 
resistance from traders and limited commitment from 
political and bureaucratic elites, despite protracted 
efforts to do so, and the Mgona informal groundnut 
export market continues to thrive without any effort to 
regulate its obvious illegality. 
The Mgona export market is described as informal even 
though there is some semblance of formal organisation 
on the basis of its overall operative dynamics, which 
seek to circumvent established government laws 
governing export trade in Malawi. This characterisation 
draws from the notion of informality propagated by 
Helmke and Levitisky (2004). Informality underlies 
socially shared rules, usually unwritten, which are 
created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels. Both the export mandate 
and Mgona export market demonstrate the apparent 
strategic neglect and capture of the groundnut 
value chain by a small group of very well-connected 
business (local and foreign), bureaucratic, and political 
elites. These elites benefit from various streams of rent 
5 THE STRATEGIC NEGLECT AND 
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from the reigning chaos and disorder in the groundnut 
value chain. They are therefore resisting efforts to alter 
the institutional framework for groundnut export trade, 
which would change the distribution of rents currently 
obtained from it. This aligns with Khan’s (2017) 
argument that stakeholders in a sector or otherwise 
can be expected to support, resist, or distort particular 
institutions or policies depending on their interests and 
capabilities.
5.1 The establishment of export 
mandates
5.1.1 The origins of export mandates
The efforts to establish export mandates build on the 
government’s goal to establish structured markets as 
a solution to inefficiencies in the crop export market. 
According to Gondwe and Baulch (2017), a structured 
market is an organised and formal place where 
farmers, traders, processers, millers, banks, and other 
stakeholders enter organised and regulated trading 
and financial arrangements. While the Reserve Bank 
of Malawi Exchange Control Act of 2005 requires 
exporters to declare and remit export proceeds, 
some exporters either do not remit or under declare 
their export proceeds. Export mandates are therefore 
designed to curb the proliferation of informal cross 
border trade and expand formal export earnings 
by dictating that a commodity can only be exported 
through a structured market. Export mandates are 
becoming an imperative for Malawi due to declining 
export proceeds from tobacco, as a result of the 
anti-tobacco smoking campaign and volatile prices. 
Expanding export mandates beyond tobacco and tea 
– Malawi’s major exports – to cover other commodities, 
such as soya beans, pigeon peas, sunflowers, and 
groundnuts, could help Malawi to diversify its export 
earnings in the face of declining demand for tobacco 
(Gondwe and Baulch 2017).
The emergence of structured markets for crops other 
than tobacco and tea can be traced back to 2006 
when the ACE was established. This was followed 
by the establishment of the AHCX in 2013 (Nyondo, 
Nankhuni and Me-ksope 2018). The benefits of 
commodity exchanges as structured markets include 
enabling farmers to access collateral finance through 
warehouse receipt systems; providing better price 
premiums through aggregation and the enhancement 
of commodity quality; the reduction of post-harvest 
losses; the availability of up-to-date information 
on prices and trading processes; and smoothing 
23 Interview with the Coordinator of one of the government’s supported agricultural projects, 19 July 2020
24 Ibid.
surpluses that occur during harvest (Gondwe and 
Baulch 2017). Furthermore, commodity exchanges 
perform many vital functions, such as facilitating price 
discovery, promoting standardised contracts and 
grading systems, and enforcing contracts.
While export mandates have some advantages, they 
are not without any setbacks. The advantages of 
export mandates include increased volumes of formal 
trade; increased tax revenues through formal trade; 
improvements in the prices and revenues farmers 
receive; and the reduction of informal trade. On 
the other hand, the setbacks include the increased 
likelihood of creating a monopsony in crop export; 
heavy transport costs on the part of exporters; and 
the potential to cause informal market growth by 
encouraging more actors to circumvent exchange fees 
(Nyondo, Nankhuni and Me-ksope 2018; Gondwe and 
Baulch 2017). 
The key players in the efforts to establish export 
mandates include government (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Ministry of Trade), commodity exchanges (ACE 
and AHCX), Malawian traders of Asian origin (Rab 
Processors, ETG, Farmers World, Agora, Transglobe, 
etc.), Malawian traders with political connections (Mulli 
Brothers and Simama General Dealers) and emerging 
Malawian traders (Ntalimanja Holdings, Takondwa 
Commodities, Dalitso General Dealers etc.), and 
development partners (FCDO, EU, and the World Food 
Programme [WFP]). All formal traders belong to the 
Grain Traders Association of Malawi (GTAM). 
5.1.2 The organisation of export mandates
The Malawian government has designated ACE 
and AHCX as platforms for institutionalising export 
mandates in the country. These commodity 
exchanges will serve as organised structured markets 
for agricultural produce in the country. This means 
that, once effective, no agricultural produce will be 
exported without passing through either ACE or 
AHCX. This is going to improve the welfare of farmers 
because ‘commodity exchanges offer competitive and 
transparent marketing of agricultural commodities’.23 
Through commodity exchanges, suppliers links to 
buyers are guided entirely by quality and quantity 
considerations, which ensures farmers often receive 
decent returns. Potential buyers deposit money into 
the commodity exchange, which locks up business 
with suppliers ‘once the suppliers agree with the price 
the buyer is looking for’.24 The major benefit for the 
commodity exchanges is the fees that are levied to 
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both suppliers and buyers. The proposal is that both 
the suppliers and the off-takers will be charged 2 per 
cent for transactions.
In the absence of export mandates, the government 
uses export bans to regulate exports. The commodities 
that are subjected to export bans include maize and 
legumes, in particular, soya beans and groundnuts 
(Scott and Chinsinga 2018). The introduction of 
export mandates will render the ad hoc export bans 
unnecessary, which, in turn, should increase the 
volumes of produce traded via structured markets. 
This would further allow a more stable and transparent 
policy environment that would permit private sector 
traders and commercial farmers to develop without 
fear of well-intentioned, but disruptive government 
interventions. The effectiveness of export restrictions, 
whether in the form of export taxes or quantitative 
limitations, can be further undermined by unregulated 
activities, which are not visible to authorities (Gondwe 
and Baulch 2017). The expectation is that once the 
export mandates become functional the country would 
start benefiting from the agricultural export trade. One 
of the interviewees for this study argued that, ‘Malawi 
is like an open, [an] unfenced garden where monkeys 
are feasting on the green maize cobs without being 
chased or disciplined… these monkeys are both local 
and foreign exporters of agricultural produce from the 
country’.25
5.1.3 Contestations about export mandates
There is generally support for the introduction of export 
mandates, but there are disagreements about how 
they should be operationalised. These contestations, 
however, mask the deeper underlying incentives and 
interests that are behind the positions taken by the 
major protagonists in this process. Both commodity 
exchanges are considered too weak to direct their 
expected functions independently. This is attributed 
to the fact that the volume of trade taking place in 
these exchanges is too low for them to be effective. 
The proposal is that these two exchanges should 
be merged, ‘but the practical modalities of doing so 
cannot be easily churned out and agreed upon’.26 
The suggestion to merge ACE and AHCX is echoed 
by Gondwe and Baulch (2017). They argue that the 
volumes traded by both ACE and AHCX are rather low, 
casting doubt on the financial sustainability of each 
commodity exchange’s operations. A merger would 
likely reduce operating costs through economies 
25 Interview with one of the emerging local commodity traders, 10 August 2020
26 Ibid.
27 Interview with a member of GTAM, 15 August 2020
28 Ibid.
29 Interview with one of the leading Agricultural Economists in Malawi, 24 August 2020
30 Ibid.
31 Interview with a member of GTAM, 28 July 2020
of scale and commissions, thereby enhancing the 
volumes traded and revenue in the long-term.
Stakeholders hold several reservations about both 
commodity exchanges. Most traders argue that ACE 
is not well suited to execute the export mandates 
because it is not well constituted as an impartial arbiter. 
They argue that ACE is both a trust and a commercial 
entity, which would compromise its dealings as a 
platform for commodity export transactions. The 
main challenge is that the ‘ACE Board of Directors are 
also big commodity traders, which would invariably 
engender conflict[s] of interest’.27 Moreover, ‘while we 
agree with the export mandate, we do not think ACE 
is the right institution because they have been unable 
to find viable export markets for their currently low 
levels of trade… we do not think they can find viable 
and lucrative markets when they get the authority to 
execute the export mandates’.28 While the export 
mandate regulations posit that big traders should not 
buy directly from farmers, ACE works directly with 
farmers. They give farmers 30kg of groundnut seed 
and farmers pay back 150kg, leaving farmers with 
excess production to find markets on their own. The 
concern is that while ACE has a commodity trading 
license, they engage in barter trading (the exchange of 
groundnuts with groundnuts instead of using money as 
a medium of exchange), which is not creating a market 
for farmers.
Many stakeholders feel strongly that ACE survives 
because of its strong reliance on donor support in its 
guise as a trust. In particular, as a trust ACE is able 
‘to capture donor money through lucrative contracts… 
ACE has been procuring maize for WFP, which it uses to 
support school feeding programmes… ACE also gets 
contracts to supply donors’ maize for humanitarian 
causes’.29 Had it not been for these contracts, the 
argument is that ACE would have folded because ‘it 
would not be able to pay salaries for its employees as it 
does not make enough money on the platform’.30 AHCX 
is equally unsustainable as it is hugely dependent on 
government business. A member of GTAM concluded 
that ‘both ACE and AHCX are dead institutions: ACE 
cannot survive without donors and AHCX without 
government preferential support’.31 In their current 
state, stakeholders argue that both ACE and AHCX 
are not ready to implement the export mandates. 
They both lack the requisite infrastructure, such as 
warehouses and quality assurance facilities, to mediate 
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the execution of export mandates. Moreover, both 
have dismal track records in identifying lucrative export 
markets for agricultural produce. An International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) study has, in fact, 
concluded that commodity exchange platforms in 
Malawi have not benefited farmers (Nyondo, Nankhuni 
and Me-ksope 2018).
Most stakeholders are concerned that while the 
government is aware of these limitations, it is still 
keen to designate export mandates as an exclusive 
domain for ACE and AHCX. This is raising a great 
deal of suspicion among stakeholders about collusion 
between government officials and the owners of the 
commodity exchange platforms. Many fear that those 
colluding want to exploit the fees that suppliers and 
buyers will be paying to promote selfish interests. 
Given the hybrid nature of ACE, some stakeholders 
felt the operational fees could be exploited to finance 
its commercial component, systematically frustrating 
or undercutting the emerging local traders. Moreover, 
there is a strong feeling that export mandates risk 
undermining contract farming due to the lack of 
flexibility in the trading arrangements. Some of the local 
traders felt that: 
The imposition and enforcement of export 
mandates will be a huge deterrent to commercial 
farmers because they will be forced to sell 
through either ACE or AHCX, which, through 
the exorbitant fees, will be reaping where they 
did not sow and using the same proceeds 
to undercut us. (Interview with a member of 
GTAM, 28 July 2020) 
However, some of these traders have strong links to 
the thriving Mgona informal groundnut export market, 
which is fully explored in the next section. These 
traders are therefore very unlikely to patronise ACE/
AHCX platforms unless they are forced. As such, they 
will resist the formal implementation and enforcement 
of the export mandates to continue benefiting from 
the streams of rents proffered by the Mgona informal 
groundnut export market.
The export mandates cannot be effectively 
implemented, let alone enforced, due to the fierce 
resistance of a very well-organised cartel of traders, 
which have some strong political connections. Some 
of these companies are entirely Malawian companies, 
while others are owned by Malawians of Asian origin, 
which have sister companies either in the Middle East 
32 Interview with a member of GTAM, 10 August 2020
33 Ibid.
34 Interview with an official from the Ministry of Agriculture, 24 July 2020
or Asia. While the Malawian companies exploit their 
political connections to delay the implementation of 
export mandates, the companies owned by Malawians 
of Asian origin exploit transfer pricing through their 
sister companies elsewhere. These companies 
buy from farmers cheaply and export to their sister 
companies by under declaring the volumes exported, 
as well as the price at which these commodities were 
actually procured. They resist the introduction of export 
mandates because once they come into effect, they 
will not be able to directly buy from farmers and they 
will not have the liberty to under declare the volumes of 
their exports. This cartel has captured both politicians 
and technocrats: 
The members [of this cartel] bankroll the 
politicians or give them a slot to export their 
share… so too technocrats, who, in turn, are 
not able to enforce basic policy guidelines 
regarding commodity export, which are clearly 
provided for in the CGA, 2017. (Interview with 
one of the emerging local commodity traders, 
29 July 2020)
All this happens behind the scenes, but it explains the 
protracted delays or lack of progress in the promulgation 
let alone enforcement of export mandates.
The alternative proposal by most stakeholders, 
especially emerging local commodity traders, is that 
ADMARC should be vested with the authority to 
execute the export mandates on an interim basis for 
at least two years, while the government works on a 
permanent framework. Given the inherent challenges 
of ACE and AHCX, ‘ADMARC is better suited for this 
role because it would serve as a genuine impartial 
arbiter’.32 In addition, ADMARC has a previous credible 
track record serving in a similar role and, ‘it would be 
a way of guaranteeing that proceeds from commodity 
export trade are being ploughed back into the economy 
for the benefit of Malawians’.33 Unlike both ACE and 
AHCX, ADMARC has an extensive infrastructure 
network, which it can effectively utilise for this purpose. 
The paradox, however, is that government is still 
determined to vest authority for export mandates in 
ACE and AHCX. This ‘raises suspicion of organised 
rent extraction, when these two platforms do not 
clearly have the requisite capacity’.34 
The advice to government by most of the technocrats 
and traders was that it should learn from the successes 
of Ethiopia and Rwanda. These two countries have 
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managed to establish robust commodity exchange 
platforms, which are effectively executing export 
mandates. In both cases, they indicated that the 
government played a critical role. The commodity 
exchange platforms started off as fully government 
owned until all the relevant systems were developed 
and fully functional. It was only after they became fully 
functional that the government began to progressively 
divest ownership to the private sector. The underlying 
argument is that ‘viable commodity exchange 
platforms executing export mandates cannot be 
effectively established unless government takes bold 
steps to fight deeply entrenched donor and business 
interests’.35 This is imperative, especially now that ‘the 
country is financially bleeding: tobacco is not doing well; 
it is not bringing in enough money to effectively power 
the country’s economy’.36 Thus, without organised 
markets, the country is losing a lot of export revenue 
that would otherwise help to power the development 
of Malawi.
5.2 The Mgona informal groundnut 
export market
5.2.1 The origins of the market
The Mgona informal groundnut export market 
is dominated by East African citizens, especially 
Burundians, most of whom initially came to Malawi 
as refugees. They have established a reputation for 
themselves as versatile entrepreneurs in various 
sectors. As such, they are generally treated with 
envy by local Malawians. They often prosper within 
very short periods of time when they venture into any 
economic endeavour. The market runs essentially from 
March to December every year, although practically 
speaking, it is an all year round affair.
The market is supplied in several different ways. 
Farmers from groundnut growing districts, especially 
Kasungu, Mchinji, and Ntchisi, bring their groundnuts 
to Mgona for sale. Alternatively, vendors go out to buy 
groundnuts from farmers in the groundnut producing 
areas, which they, in turn, sell to the Mgona market. 
Interviewees for this study indicated that they started 
off the 2019/20 season buying groundnuts at MK3,500 
per 20l pail. At the time of the fieldwork for this study, 
the price had peaked to MK4,000 per 20l pail. Some 
of the Burundian traders commission vendors to 
buy groundnuts on their behalf from farmers. These 
vendors are either commissioned from Lilongwe or 
contracted in their respective villages as groundnut 
buying agents. They get commission depending on 
the volume of groundnuts bought. For some of the 
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with the Manager of an agricultural commercialisation project supported by the World Bank, 31 August 2020
37 Interview with a vendor at the Mgona informal groundnut export market, 10 September 2020
38  Interview with a vendor at the Mgona informal groundnut export market, 10 September 2020
buying agents, especially those contracted from their 
respective villages, engagement in this value chain has 
been a life changing experience, as reported in several 
life histories (Chinsinga et al. 2020). Furthermore, 
Burundian traders loan money to farmers to grow 
groundnuts on the understanding that the groundnuts 
will be sold to them. The money is meant to help 
farmers buy inputs and take care of the groundnut 
fields to guarantee high productivity. A small number 
of Burundians lease land to cultivate groundnuts 
themselves, which they process for sale through the 
Mgona informal groundnut export market.
5.2.2 The market processes
Groundnuts are brought to the Mgona market unshelled. 
So, the first task for the farmers or the vendors is to 
get their groundnuts shelled. The development of this 
market has prompted some innovation in groundnut 
shelling technology, which includes both manual and 
electronic groundnut shellers. Strikingly, all electric 
groundnut shelling machines are owned by Burundians, 
while nearly all manual ones are owned by locals, who 
have innovated their modelling based on the electronic 
groundnut shelling machines. These machines 
have played a key role ‘in facilitating the growth and 
development of [Mgona] groundnut market, since hand 
shelling is a labour intensive exercise or undertaking’.37 
The charge for the manual shellers is MK700 per 90kg 
of groundnuts, while the charge for electric shellers is 
MK700 per 50kg of groundnuts.
The next stage is to get the groundnuts sieved and 
graded so that they are ready for sale to Burundian 
buyers. These two stages are exclusively women’s 
domain. The women charge MK600 per 50kg bag 
to sieve groundnuts, while grading costs MK400 per 
50kg. 
The market for groundnuts is quite dynamic. The prices 
are responsive to the forces of demand and supply: 
‘[prices] even vary within a day three or four times, so 
one has to be on the look out to make sure you get the 
highest price for the day’.38 While all the groundnuts 
are bought by Burundians, there is some differentiation 
among the buyers. The initial buyers of groundnuts are 
mostly agents for other richer Burundians, who give 
them money to buy groundnuts. They, in turn, get a 
MK10/kg commission for the total volume of groundnuts 
purchased. The Mgona market is attractive to farmers 
from groundnut growing districts because the prices 
at which the Burundians buy groundnuts are often 
about twice the minimum prices set by government. 
For the 2019/20 market season, for example, the price 
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of groundnuts at Mgona market peaked at MK870/kg 
compared to MK400/kg set by the government. Some 
of the Burundian merchants revealed that some of the 
groundnuts are sold locally to companies engaged in 
the production of government paste and peanut butter.
5.2.3 The export market
The main export destinations for groundnuts from 
Mgona, Lilongwe, are Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, 
‘but the groundnuts do get as far as Kampala, Kigali, 
Bujumbura, and even Kinshasa’.39 The widespread 
perception is that Mgona groundnut exports target low 
end markets, which are not bothered about aflatoxin 
levels. Malawi’s groundnuts end up on the streets of 
most capitals in East Africa.
One of the respondents interviewed for this study 
indicated that he tried to participate in Mgona export 
market, but could not get tangible information about it. 
He concluded that, ‘this is a different type of market that 
[re]lies on social networks and social capital throughout 
the value chain’.40 This means that to participate in 
this market, one must know people every step of the 
chain, including at the other side of the market. He 
emphasised that, ‘the actors in this market are able to 
speak the same language: Malawians do not have the 
language to participate directly in this export market 
chain’.41 An official from one of the farmer organisations 
drew parallels to the cassava market in Lilongwe. He 
observed that the cassava market at the Lilongwe 
Central Market is highly protected to the extent that, 
‘even when there is no cassava in town, no supplier 
outside the allowable circuit can sell cassava… if they 
do, the consequences are dire’.42
The main concern for most stakeholders is that this 
export market is creating a parallel foreign exchange 
system. On their way back, the trucks that transport the 
groundnuts to export markets are loaded with assorted 
merchandise for sale in Malawi. A disproportionate 
share of the merchandise constitutes Unilever products, 
which are sold to wholesalers to make supernormal 
profits. All this trade is reportedly circumventing the 
formal trade protocols and controls. While GTAM 
members regard this market as unimportant, describing 
it as the export of groundnut husks, interviews with the 
traders and exporters revealed that some of the leading 
groundnut processors purchase their groundnuts from 
the Mgona market. The following sentiments capture 
the underlying dynamics of this export trade: 
39 Interview with a Burundian trader at Mgona informal groundnut export market, 10 September 2020
40 Interview with an emerging local trader, 16 August 2020
41 Ibid.
42 Interview with an official of one of the farmers’ organisations, 28 August 2020
43 Interview a member of GTAM, 6 August 2020
44 Interview with an official of one of the farmers’ organisation, 8 August 2020
We have seen rampant informal export trade 
of local products, largely by foreign traders, 
to our disadvantage because we follow formal 
procedures and channels: they create unfair 
competition, they bring in dollars and change 
[their money] at the black market with higher 
margins, then [they] buy and export informally 
at higher profits, which give them an upper 
hand (Chilundu 2020).
Most GTAM members described the Mgona informal 
groundnut export market as not something to worry 
about as, ‘it is simply a vendor market; the quality of 
groundnuts traded there is very poor… it is a market 
that deals with groundnut rejects’.43 Some other 
respondents interviewed for this study argued that, 
‘GTAM members described what is exported as 
merely husks, and not necessarily groundnuts, yet 
they deliberately mix the groundnuts with husks as a 
strategic ploy to evade custom requirements’.44 GTAM 
members described the thriving Mgona informal 
groundnut export market as a sign of the failure of 
structured markets in Malawi. The underlying argument 
is that the market failures, manifested in the thriving 
informal groundnut export market, underpin the failure 
of the government to take responsibility.
5.3 Implications for the groundnut 
value chain
GTAM’s trivialisation of the Mgona informal groundnut 
export market and the government’s inaction, which 
allows the market to thrive, despite the Control Goods 
Act (CGA) requiring every export trader to be licensed, 
raises several questions. The trading is done openly and 
the trucks transporting groundnuts pass through the 
borders with groundnuts on the way out and assorted 
merchandise on their way back. These trucks are not 
apprehended at all. The issue has reportedly been 
discussed in several meetings involving government 
officials, traders, CSOs, and development partners, 
but no concrete action has ever been taken. The 
conclusion is that the system is captured. It appears 
that some GTAM members, politicians, technocrats, 
and independent Malawian traders are benefiting from 
this market. They are supplying this market through 
their Burundian surrogates. This seems a plausible 
explanation because of the blatant illegality of this 
market, which would otherwise have faced efforts to 
thwart it altogether or, at least, to formalise it, given that 
it has been a subject of intense discussion in several 
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policy forums. The government is losing considerable 
revenue due to voluminous informal groundnut exports. 
Both the failure to implement export mandates and 
inaction to curtail the Mgona informal groundnut 
export market demonstrate, inter alia, that policy 
processes are often deeply imbued with the clash of 
competing interests and viewpoints (Chinsinga 2018; 
Araujo, Acosta and Saiegh 2004). In fact, politics plays 
a crucial role in shaping development outcomes, when 
construed as contestation and bargaining between 
interest groups with competing claims over rights and 
resources.
The political interests that prevent the implementation 
of impartial and objective policy solutions mean that 
the apparent recovery in the productivity levels of 
groundnuts – due to the decline of tobacco, support 
from donors/NGOs, and government policies and 
programmes – will not benefit the country’s quest for 
increased income from the agricultural sector. The net 
benefit from the productivity recovery of the groundnut 
value chain is likely to remain limited, especially to the 
government. The country is producing groundnuts 
that cannot be competitive in the formal markets. 
Even when opportunities exist to improve the quality 
of groundnut production, farmers are reluctant to 
take these up because they are still able to benefit 
immensely from their low quality groundnuts through 
the vibrant Mgona informal groundnut export market. 
To reiterate, the buyers in this market are not concerned 
about the quality of groundnuts they get from farmers. 
Politicians and technocrats benefit from the current 
state of affairs, which has resulted in them dragging 
their feet in implementing export mandates that would 
formalise the trading of all major crops in the country, 
including groundnuts.
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The following examination of social differentiation 
in the groundnut value chain principally focuses on 
three areas: 1) barriers to entry and/or requirements 
for participation in the value chain; 2) the ability of 
participants to improve their performance; and 3) the 
differences between and among participants’ access 
to and control over the benefits from the value chain. An 
additional fourth area of focus relates to the underlying 
dynamics of the Mgona informal groundnut export 
market, which further magnify the social differentiation 
processes and their implications for the different 
participants in the market. The discussion on the first 
three elements of social differentiation in the groundnut 
value chain draws heavily from the work of Cook et 
al. (2014), which has been amplified by insights from 
stakeholder interviews conducted for this study. Cook 
et al. (2014) explore social dynamics in three different 
value chains, namely: groundnuts, soya beans, and 
dairy. The processes of social differentiation in the 
groundnut value chain can be fully understood when 
placed in the broader context of social differentiation 
in rural Malawi. The processes are partly underpinned 
by the liberalisation of burley tobacco cultivation and 
the emergence of medium-scale farmers, especially 
since the turn of the new millennium. The processes 
of social differentiation are exacerbated and magnified, 
in some instances, by the underlying dynamics of 
intersectionality, whereby different markers of either 
advantage or disadvantage coincide to promote 
positive benefits or deepen social disadvantages, 
respectively.
6.1 Social differentiation in rural 
Malawi
6.1.1 The liberalisation of burley tobacco 
cultivation
The cultivation of burley tobacco was liberalized in the 
early 1990s. Until the liberalisation, the cultivation of 
burley tobacco was the preserve of the estate sub-
sector (Chinsinga 2018; Masanjala 2006). As part of the 
SAPs, the cultivation of burley tobacco was opened to 
smallholder farmers as a potential solution to Malawi’s 
development impasse. According to Prowse and 
Grassin (2020), tobacco production would kick-start 
productivity increases in the smallholder sub-sector 
for both food and export crops, as well as stimulating 
demand for goods and services in the non-farm rural 
economy. Through burley cultivation, Malawi would 
make significant strides in the fight against poverty and 
food insecurity. The cultivation of burley tobacco would 
enable smallholder farmers to access decent cash 
incomes to allow them to buy food from the market or 
buy productivity enhancing inputs that would facilitate 
the production of both cash and food crops on an 
extensive scale.
This historic change in Malawi’s agrarian set-up 
triggered massive social differentiation on two fronts. 
The cultivation of burley tobacco was dominated and 
monopolised by men. Not all men, however, dominated 
the cultivation of tobacco. It was mainly those from 
better off families (those owning generally no less 
than 5ha of land) to allow for the cultivation of burley 
tobacco and other crops. Most of these men were 
connected to families that are influential in the village 
setting (traditional leaders; established businesses; 
senior retired public service employees; local political 
leaders, especially those connected with the political 
party in power; and government frontline workers, 
such as extension workers, community development 
assistants, health surveillance assistants, and even 
primary school teachers). Most of these categories of 
men are able to raise capital to invest in the cultivation 
of burley tobacco through their social networks, 
including through opportunities offered by external 
agents such as cooperatives, NGOs, and even tobacco 
companies. Some poorer men, and the majority of 
male youth, have been working as casual labourers in 
the tobacco gardens of the better off farmers. Most 
of the poorer men do not have adequate land, they 
usually farm on less than 1ha and struggle to achieve 
subsistence (Eyolf and Mvula 2007). Youth from better 
off households support their parents on their farms, 
while establishing themselves as independent adults 
along the way. However, most of the poorer youth have 
not been to school, some of them have completed 
secondary school, but are unable to find employment. 
A few young men escape this predicament and end up 
working in the sector as agents of NGOs, facilitating 
cooperatives or supporting access to credit. Most 
of these young men have at least completed their 
secondary education.
6 SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THE 
GROUNDNUT VALUE CHAIN
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The majority of women were relegated to the cultivation 
of other crops. It is, thus, against this backdrop that 
groundnut was described as a women’s crop. In 
fact, Farm Radio International (2013) indicated that 
groundnuts in Malawi are mostly grown by small-scale, 
resource poor farmers, particularly women. During this 
period, women farmers typically devoted more land 
to groundnut than men and grew it as a subsistence 
crop. Farm Radio International (2013) concluded that 
groundnuts can be an important source of income, 
especially for women farmers, who have been mostly 
excluded from growing cash crops such as tobacco. 
It is not just women from female headed households 
that grow groundnuts, poor married women grew and 
still grow groundnuts to cater for subsistence, as well 
as for sale in the local markets to raise cash for basic 
household needs, especially salt, cooking oil, and 
milling maize. 
Women groundnut farmers were, in some cases, 
joined by poorer male youth, who were struggling 
to establish themselves in life. The youth grow 
groundnuts as a means to raise income to improve 
their livelihood opportunities. Most of them intend to 
raise cash for building their own houses, or to raise 
capital to venture into the off-farm economy, especially 
petty trading. The major constraint for them, however, 
continues to be access to land. Most of the poorer 
youth are unable to access land from their families 
due to increasing pressure for land. Landholding per 
capita has diminished substantially over the past two 
decades to as low as 0.33ha (Chinsinga 2018; Moyo 
2016).
Women who engaged in tobacco cultivation came 
from better off households as wives, daughters, and 
nieces (Chinsinga 2018; Masanjala 2006). Women 
participating in the cultivation of tobacco, who were 
either divorced or widowed, were also mostly from 
better off households. However, some of these 
women made their way up through entrepreneurship, 
supported by micro-finance institutions. They had 
decided to engage in tobacco cultivation as a means 
of diversifying their livelihood portfolio. Some of these 
women were government frontline workers and 
some were politicians in their own right or had links 
to influential people who opened up opportunities for 
them. 
An assessment by Masanjala (2006), revealed that the 
majority of women were engaged in the tobacco value 
chain as middlemen. They purchased tobacco from the 
poorer farmers, cultivating on less than 1ha, and sold 
to better off farmers with direct access to the auction 
floors. The majority of poorer women, whether married, 
divorced, or widowed, worked as labourers or focused 
on the cultivation of other crops such as groundnuts. 
Some of the poorer men, their families, and the youth, 
especially male youth, cultivated tobacco on their 
small pieces of land to sell to either the middlemen or 
better off farmers. Young women, whether from poor 
or better off households, are completely marginalised. 
Of course, those with some education attempt to join 
the NGO circle, but very few are successful.
The social differentiation driven by burley tobacco 
took a different turn following the introduction of 
contract farming. There is a growing preference for 
the cultivation of tobacco under contracts because it 
allows merchants to meet manufacturers’ compliance 
and traceability requirements. For tobacco to be 
competitive, farmers have to demonstrate the proper 
usage of chemicals and prove that it has been 
produced without exploiting child labour. Prowse and 
Grassin (2020) demonstrate how the introduction of 
the cultivation of tobacco under contracts has led to 
the deepening of social differentiation. Through the 
institutional arrangements that facilitate the cultivation 
of tobacco under contracts, a new social class has 
emerged. This class plays an intermediary role between 
the villagers growing tobacco and the outside world, 
or more precisely, the tobacco industry. Prowse and 
Grassin (2020) call members of this emerging social 
class brokers. Brokers generally act as the interlocutors 
for the leaf merchants and public institutions, such as 
the TCC.
Not everyone can qualify as a broker. They fit a particular 
profile. They are often members of a prominent 
family; have some political connections; are retired 
from public service or from security agencies; have 
a good reputation among smallholders; and serve as 
examples to the rest of tobacco farmers. The position 
of a club or zone leader within the integrated production 
system (IPS) enables the brokers to become the main 
gatekeepers for any smallholder farmer wishing to grow 
tobacco with a particular company. They thus become 
professionals of intermediation and occupy a privileged 
position at the juncture between the tobacco industry 
and the moral economy, which regulates village life 
(Prowse and Grassin 2020). Through local networks 
and regular meetings in town, these brokers strengthen 
their image as well-connected individuals and semi-
urban actors with all the associated and frequently 
misplaced connotations of modernity and progress. 
These brokers have, in some cases, become very 
important as the first point of call for villagers’ contact 
with the outside world; to the extent that sometimes 
they even take precedence over chiefs. They have, in 
fact, usurped Ministry of Agriculture extension officers’ 
roles, who are becoming less important than they once 
were in rural areas due to their limited resources.
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The emergence of brokers reveals that tobacco 
cultivation through contract farming has led to greater 
social differentiation within smallholder communities, 
reconfiguring power relations. Additionally, through the 
stringent requirements for compliance and traceability, 
contract farming tends to be exclusionary. Wealthier 
smallholders are able to shift to the IPS required by 
contractors, whilst poor households are often unable 
to meet these demands and are excluded from 
contract farming (Prowse and Grassin 2020). This is 
because wealthier smallholders are more likely to meet 
the conditions for obtaining contracts, such as cash 
deposits, financial credibility, and sufficient land to 
produce the demanded amount of tobacco. 
These developments in social differentiation, to a great 
extent, underlie the enduring legacy of the one-party 
political settlement. Most of the families that emerged 
as serious tobacco farmers post liberalisation were 
beneficiaries of the rents dispensed during that era. 
The major beneficiaries of the rents from the monopoly 
of burley tobacco cultivation, until liberalisation in 
1993, included politicians, high ranking civil servants, 
employees from parastatal organisations, and senior 
officials from security agencies, namely the Malawi 
Police Service and the Malawi Defense Force, 
and traditional authorities. Families connected to 
these elites had a head start when the cultivation 
of burley tobacco was liberalised (Chinsinga 2018). 
Following the transition to democracy, those who 
seized power sought to create similar opportunities 
for their families and patronage networks, focusing 
on commerce and industry as new avenues for the 
accumulation of wealth. This, in turn, has created 
a chain of patron-client relationships that pervade 
the entire system, privileging those with political, 
economic, and social ties to the ruling elites. These 
opportunities are somewhat extended to those who 
have some education or have demonstrated acumen 
in entrepreneurship through social ties. If an aspiring 
elite plays the game well, they might manage to open 
a door of opportunities for themselves as patrons, 
and thereby open up opportunities for their families, 
friends, or acquaintances. The underlying dynamics 
of the political settlement, in terms of creating winners 
and losers, has fundamentally remained the same, 
despite adapting to the demands of the multi-party 
electoral context. 
6.1.2 The emergence of medium-scale farmers
The processes of social differentiation driven by 
burley tobacco are further exacerbated by the 
remarkable processes of structural agrarian change 
and transformation, through the emergence of 
medium-scale farmers (Answeeuw et al. 2016). Most 
respondents interviewed for this study noted that 
medium-scale farms have become a major force 
in Malawi’s agricultural sector. In fact, according 
to Malawi’s most recent official agricultural survey, 
medium-scale farms account for over a quarter of all 
land under cultivation. To put the development into 
proper perspective, for example, it is estimated that 
the area of land acquired by medium-scale farmers in 
the districts of Kasungu, Lilongwe, and Mchinji almost 
doubled between 2000 and 2015.
What makes this agrarian transformation even more 
interesting is the emerging pattern of ownership of 
these medium-scale farms. It is estimated that 54 per 
cent of the medium-scale landholdings resulted from 
the accumulation of land by small-scale farmers. The 
remaining 46 per cent are urban-based professionals, 
entrepreneurs, and civil servants, who have acquired 
land and started farming mid-life (Answeeuw et al. 2016). 
The emergence of this class of farmers is transforming 
the countryside in interesting ways. These farmers 
are pumping massive income from employment or 
business into the agricultural sector, triggering growth 
and development that may significantly alter the nature 
and pattern of rural-urban growth linkages. Through 
this agricultural growth trend an increasing number of 
smallholder farmers are losing their land, as they are 
selling it off and being displaced by this new class of 
farmers, who do not farm full-time and are often urban 
based. They are popularly referred to as weekend 
farmers (Chinsinga 2018).
In both modes of land accumulation to develop medium-
scale farms, men dominate. A formal survey has not yet 
been carried out, but those interviewed for this study 
estimated that investors in these medium-scale farms 
are almost 90 per cent male. In both cases, these men 
are middle-aged with well-established careers, both 
in the private and public sectors. In rural areas, these 
men are linked to families described as belonging to the 
class of better off smallholder farmers. Most women 
involved in medium-scale farm development are single. 
These women are equally middle-aged, established 
businesswomen and/or active politicians, particularly 
MPs. In rural areas, the acquisition and consolidation 
of medium-scale farms is dominated almost entirely by 
men (Chinsinga 2018).
Both men and women have fairly equal chances of 
accumulating land to develop medium-scale farms, 
especially when it comes to purchasing land through 
the market. The major determinant in this regard is the 
ability to pay (Eyolf and Mvula 2007). Over the years, 
a market for customary land, although not formally 
recognised in law, has developed through which 
these transactions are mediated. The disproportionate 
number of men venturing into the medium-scale 
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farming reflects the differential resource endowment 
between men and women. Men tend to be financially 
more empowered than women, but equally 
important is the fact that fewer women are aware of 
these opportunities (Jayne et al. 2019). In rural areas, 
even where land is inherited through women, the 
acquisition and consolidation of medium-scale farms 
is dominated by men. 
The apparent upsurge in weekend farming is 
attributed, inter alia, to ‘the realisation of the huge 
unexploited potential of the agriculture sector 
in the country and the increasing opportunities, 
especially in horticulture, legumes, and livestock’. 45 
Others simply think that, ‘agriculture, especially for 
those in the public sector, offers a very good exit 
strategy into retirement as opportunities abound to 
rapidly accumulate wealth’.46 Most of these farmers 
are engaged in the production of seed for either 
legumes or maize, ‘which enables them to make 
quick money, since they have networks both in the 
public and private sector to get [a] premium price for 
their seed’.47 As a result of these developments, ‘we 
are witnessing the rapid and massive displacement 
of villagers from land, especially in districts that 
are within 120km radius of Lilongwe City’.48 These 
districts are therefore experiencing massive 
proletarianization, whereby the displaced villagers 
rely almost exclusively on their labour as a means 
of livelihood, working on land that they previously 
owned.
In the context of these developments, women 
and youth are particularly hard hit due to their 
weak control over land (Cook et al. 2014). While 
symbolically, women in matrilineal settings have 
control over land, they are not the principal decision 
makers when it comes to disposal of the land and 
the subsequent utilisation of the proceeds from 
land sales. These decisions are dominated by 
men (uncles, brothers, and husbands), which often 
has disastrous consequences for the livelihoods 
and welfare of women (Djurfeldt et al. 2018). The 
apparent weak control of land by women, even 
when ownership and control is traditionally vested in 
them, is largely due to inheritance practices. Even 
in matrilineal communities, inheritance of families’ 
property (land, livestock, property etc.) is entrusted 
to male children, sometimes even when they are 
far younger than their elder sisters. This is further 
entrenched through the socialisation process. As the 
children are growing up, male children are frequently 
45 Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of FUM, 28 July 2020
46 Interview with a former official of NASFAM, 22 August 2020
47 Interview with an official of a multinational seed company in Malawi, 26 August 2020
48 Ibid.
groomed as heirs to their fathers’ estate. So, unlike 
the female children, the male children begin to learn 
about their father’s property and related managerial 
skills at an early stage, which puts them in a better 
position to ‘own’ the property, including land. This is 
despite the fact that, traditionally, land is owned/or 
inherited through female members of the family. This 
explains why land acquisition and consolidation into 
medium-scale farms in the countryside is dominated 
by men. Poorer men often end up selling off their 
land to migrate to cities to look for better paying jobs. 
If they work in the same localities with women, they 
are able to bargain for better wages. Facing cultural 
obstacles, women’s mobility is limited and, as such, 
they end up working in their respective localities, 
where they are often unable to bargain for better 
wages compared to men (Diguid and Weber 2016).
While the liberalisation of burley tobacco cultivation 
failed to work its magic, the emergence of medium-
scale farmers is simply worsening the situation. All 
expectations that the liberalisation of burley tobacco 
cultivation could solve multiple policy priorities, 
such as improve food security, reduce expensive 
fertiliser subsidies, stimulate the non-farm rural 
economy, and even lead to crop diversification hardly 
materialised (Prowse and Grassin 2020). These 
failures have been compounded by smallholder 
farmers losing massive tracts of land to emerging 
farmers, who are dominating and monopolising the 
cultivation and sale of seed by exploiting their social, 
economic, professional, and political connections. 
From the study’s interviews with key informants it 
was established that during the implementation of 
FISP, senior technocrats pushed for the liberalisation 
of seed supply to the programme beyond the 
certified members of the Seed Traders Association 
of Malawi (STAM). To ensure integrity, the policy 
initially directed that only members of STAM would 
supply seed to FISP. However, senior technocrats 
pushed for liberalisation to allow everyone to supply 
seed to the programme because most of them 
were producing seed, but were not members of 
STAM. For years FISP had been dealing in hybrid 
seed, but the technocrats pushed for the inclusion 
of the open pollinated variety (OPV) because most 
of them were producing this kind of seed and they 
made it cheaper compared to hybrid seed. For 
OPV maize seed, farmers did not pay any top-up 
for a pack of 7kg seed, while farmers had to top-
up a 5kg pack of hybrid seed, which in some cases 
cost as much as MK3,000. This ensured that most 
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farmers went for OPV seed, not because of its quality, 
but rather because it did not require them to top-up. 
The displaced smallholder farmers, especially women, 
serve merely as a reservoir of cheap labour for the 
emerging medium-scale farms. 
6.2 Inside the groundnut value chain
6.2.1 Barriers to entry into the value chain
Both men and women can freely participate in the 
groundnut value chain if they so wish (Cook et al. 2014). 
However, women face barriers related to accessing 
sufficient land to participate in the value chain on a 
viable commercial scale. As highlighted in the previous 
section, women simply enjoy symbolic ownership and 
control of land. Key decisions about land, ‘in terms 
of how to use it, [whether] to rent it out, or dispose 
[of] it altogether, and the use of the proceeds from 
the rentals or outright disposal, are made by men’.49 
There are, of course, differentiated experiences among 
women in this regard. Independent women, who are 
relatively wealthier in their own right and/or come from 
better off families, do exercise control over their land. 
These women are able ‘to venture into groundnut 
farming on a commercial scale, but these [women] are 
very limited, we can actually count them’.50
The majority of women, including those who are 
independent as widows or divorced, do not have 
practical control over their land to enable them to 
enter the groundnut value chain. They are not able to 
exercise control over land because ‘most of them are 
disposed of their land, especially if they were staying at 
their husbands’ villages, or they are simply too poor to 
make productive use of the land, even when they still 
have control over it’.51 Married women are often at the 
receiving end of decisions made by their husbands. Even 
among women, who are either widowed or divorced, 
but have male children who are over 20 years-old, ‘the 
decision making processes get transferred to these 
children, which further marginalises the women’.52 This 
means that compared to women and female youth, 
male youth – who also face barriers in accessing land 
– are slightly better off due to two interlinked factors: 
socialisation and inheritance practices (Djurfeldt et al. 
2018).
Women are reportedly facing displacement from the 
groundnut value chain following the collapse of tobacco 
as a leading cash crop (Mgalamadzi 2018; Cook et 
al. 2014). As early as 2013, Farm Radio International 
observed that, ‘men farmers are devoting more land 
49 Interview with an official of a multinational seed company in Malawi, 26 August 2020
50 Interview with a traditional leader in Ntchisi District, October 2018
51 Interview with a traditional leader in Mchinji District, September 2018
52 Ibid.
to groundnuts, specifically growing it as a cash crop’. 
Thus, women appear to be losing their position in 
the value chain to men as groundnuts become more 
lucrative than tobacco or cotton, which were exclusively 
male domains. Following these developments, women 
are slowly but steadily participating in the groundnut 
value chain as labourers due to the dominance of men 
in the decision making positions at household level. 
The key informant interviews undertaken for this 
study, as well as the relevant literature, suggest that 
groundnuts have evolved from being a crop that 
depends exclusively on family labour to a crop that 
now attracts hired labour. Both poor married and 
independent women find it very difficult to augment 
family labour with hired labour for groundnut cultivation, 
even though groundnut is re-emerging as a viable 
alternative cash crop to tobacco. In male headed 
households, women find it harder to use family labour 
on groundnut fields, especially if such cultivation is not 
supported or driven by their husbands. Both better off 
women (especially those who are independent) and 
men are able to hire additional labour to commercialise 
their groundnut farming because they have easy 
access to cash. However, most women are poorer 
compared to men, since they engage less in off-farm 
enterprises because they do not have the requisite 
capital and are restricted in their movements out of 
the homestead (Agar and Chalmers 2014). With the 
exception of youth from well off families, most of young 
men are unable to hire additional labour because they 
are struggling to become established in life and they 
are yet to accumulate enough wealth. 
Both poor and better off women are constrained from 
participating in off-farm economic opportunities due to 
social and cultural considerations. In rural Malawi, the 
burden of domestic responsibilities, such as preparing 
food, taking care of children, and taking care of the 
sick, falls disproportionately on the shoulders of women 
(van Klaveren et al. 2009; Chinsinga 2004). One of the 
key informants for this study observed that:
The enduring challenge is that even when 
women are independent and they are in 
control of productive resources including land, 
they have been culturally conditioned to over-
depend on men; they consult, if not, defer 
decision making to their older male children, 
brothers, or even uncles. (Interview with one 
of the traditional leaders in Ntchisi District, 
October 2018)
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This observation has similarly been made by van 
Klaveren et al. (2009), who observed that one of the 
factors undermining women’s empowerment is that 
they are culturally dependent on men for almost 
everything. This simply reinforces the dominance of 
women in the provision of labour in the agricultural 
sector. While women manage only about 26 per cent 
of farm plots, which are generally smaller than those 
managed by men, they provide 80 per cent of the 
labour for household food production (Cook et al. 
2014).
6.2.2 Value chain actors’ ability to improve their 
performance
Improving performance is key to gaining and capturing 
the benefits from a value chain. Existing evidence shows 
that women are more disadvantaged than men when 
it comes to factors that leverage one’s performance 
in the groundnut value chain. Groundnuts are a 
labour intensive crop, involving numerous production, 
harvesting, and post-harvesting tasks, and women 
have limited access to labour compared to men in 
order to expand productivity. According to Cook et al. 
(2014), women are less able to command the labour of 
their spouses and their children, and, as such, they rely 
almost exclusively on their own labour. Women’s ability 
to increase production is therefore largely constrained 
by limited access to labour.
Women’s limited access to cash, through off-farm 
enterprises or credit facilities, further exacerbates 
barriers to increasing productivity. Expanding 
production of groundnuts will likely increase women’s 
need for hired labour and labour saving technologies 
that can improve their productivity (Cook et al. 2014; 
Farm Radio International 2013). A study by Agar and 
Chalmers (2014) showed that in Malawi agricultural 
enterprises constituted only 25 per cent of the small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). ‘Only 4 out of 67 
SMEs interviewed were primarily owned by women, 
though a few had husband and wife co-ownership, or 
another arrangement with the wife involved, but short of 
co-ownership’ (Agar and Chalmers 2014: 20). Without 
ready access to cash women rely almost exclusively on 
their own labour for groundnut production and find it 
difficult to access productivity enhancing technologies 
especially seed. 
More men than women participate in clubs or 
associations promoting the production of groundnuts. 
In some cases the participation of both men and women 
in these associations is almost the same, but men are 
still more likely to move into leadership positions (Cook 
et al. 2014). While both poor and better off women join 
clubs or associations, the poorer women are more 
marginalised than the better off women when it comes 
to decision making processes and leadership positions. 
Better off women are more likely to be considered for 
leadership positions than poorer women. However, this 
is usually for roles that are considered feminine, such 
as the secretary. According to some key informants for 
this study, poorer men have an edge over some better 
off women when it comes to leadership positions. This 
is attributed to the fact that culturally, more power is 
given to men than women. 
The problem in Malawi is that culture gives 
more power to the husband. Even if the woman 
accesses the loan, the husband may be in 
charge to manage it, who is not a member of 
the cooperative. It ends up with most of the 
husbands using the loans not in most proper 
ways contributing to default. (Borda-Rodriguez 
and Vicari 2014:12)
Participation in farmer associations for groundnut is 
critical because it improves the social capital status 
of the members, which facilitates efforts to enhance 
productivity in the value chain. Through these clubs 
or associations, participants are able to increase their 
contacts; develop friendships and other relationships, 
which often lead to increased information and 
knowledge; create social safety nets; and improve 
their access to more tangible benefits, such as inputs. 
These benefits are more easily accessed by those in 
leadership positions (Prowse and Grassin 2020; Cook 
et al. 2014).
Efforts to establish women only clubs, associations, 
and even cooperatives, have been spearheaded by 
NGOs and some UN agencies, with support from 
various government departments and ministries 
(Borda-Rodriguez and Vicari 2014). Organisations 
such as NASFAM and FUM have also attempted to 
support women only associations, but these have 
not been very successful. This is attributed to several 
factors. The success of clubs or associations requires 
collective skills (to enable skills management, open 
discussion among members, the identification of a 
common vision, and access to training); networks 
(built on accountable leadership and interactions 
among clubs and associations); membership (built on 
a strong identity, education, cohesion and reciprocity, 
and a self-help attitude); and innovation (facilitated 
by the availability of capital and/or access to credit, 
participation in value chains, and Fairtrade). While 
research shows that women are more resilient and 
more focused on clubs or associations than men, they 
are often unable to deepen these prerequisites to make 
their clubs successful (Diguid and Weber 2016). This 
makes women only clubs or associations less able to 
benefit from the advantages that accrue from collective 
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action within the groundnut value chain. Among other 
factors, this demonstrates that women’s capacity to 
successfully navigate the association or club world is 
limited due to a lack of access to knowledge, training, 
education, and resources. 
The youth, male and female, poor or better off, are 
excluded altogether from participating in farmer 
associations. This is because most of them do not own 
land. One of the requirements for membership is that 
participants should at least have access to a piece of 
land, either through direct ownership or renting. Most 
of the youth cannot raise enough money to afford land 
rentals and are still waiting in the wings to inherit land 
from their parents.
There are several pathways to improving performance 
in the groundnut value chain, but women and youth, 
especially those of from poorer families, are clearly 
disadvantaged in all of these pathways. Farmers’ 
performance in the value chain can be improved 
by increasing production through land expansion, 
increased labour, and upgrading management skills. 
It can also be improved by securing new positions in 
the value chain, such as becoming a Lead Farmer, 
which is allocated in recognition of a farmer’s improved 
performance and good standing in the community. 
It is estimated that the social differences outlined 
in this section lead to a productivity gap of 25 per 
cent between men and women (Cook et al. 2014). 
This calls for some action to combat social, cultural, 
and traditional norms that are oppressive to women. 
Overcoming these barriers would allow women to 
expand their roles beyond domestic and reproductive 
spheres.
6.2.3 Value chain actors’ ability to access and 
control benefits
With the exception of better off independent women 
who are connected to better off families, most women 
do not access and control benefits from the groundnut 
value chain in the same way as men, even poorer 
men. This is primarily attributed to the differentiated 
roles that men and women play in the value chain 
(Farm Radio International 2013). There is a segregated 
division of labour within the groundnut value chain, 
with the participation of women concentrated in 
production and processing activities, whilst men’s 
roles are mostly concentrated in marketing. Women 
perform most of the harvesting and post-harvesting 
tasks, such as digging out plants, removing pods from 
the plants, and the onerous work of shelling. In their 
study, Cook et al. (2014), observed that following the 
transformation of groundnuts into the equivalent of a 
cash crop, men now have more responsibility for sales 
and greater control over income. Consequently, men 
now dominate the decision making processes in terms 
of land usage (i.e. how much land to devote to the 
cultivation of groundnuts); the proportion of groundnuts 
to keep for home consumption and to be taken to the 
market; and the use of the proceeds from groundnut 
marketing. This weakens married, and even widowed 
or divorced, women’s access to and control over the 
benefits from the value chain, which have emerged 
since the transformation of groundnuts into a potential 
alternative cash crop to tobacco.
Women are further disadvantaged when it comes to 
marketing, regardless of whether they are independent, 
better off, poor, or married. When women participate 
in the value chain in their own right, they often 
find it difficult to secure profitable markets for their 
groundnuts (Nyondo, Nankhuni and Me-ksope 2018). 
Women mostly sell their groundnuts to vendors, who 
purchase the groundnuts from them at farm gate prices. 
Since women do not often have lucrative alternative 
marketing outlets for groundnuts they endure the 
vendors’ unscrupulous business tendencies. The 
vendors are known for offering extremely low prices 
and malpractices in tampering with weighing scales 
(Matita 2018; Mgalamadzi 2018). Due to the poor road 
transport network, the cost of transport in Malawi is 
very high, which in turn, hinders women’s ability to 
access potentially profitable markets. Combined with 
women’s disproportionate responsibility for domestic 
tasks, cultural taboos restricting women’s movement 
away from the homestead, and concerns with the 
safety of some modes of transportation, women 
are left with vendors as their only reliable marketing 
outlet for their groundnuts. Women’s ability to access 
more lucrative markets is further exacerbated by their 
lower literacy and numeracy levels. While potentially 
profitable markets might exist, women are unable to 
take advantage of them due to the aforementioned 
constraints, which make them more dependent on 
vendors for the marketing of groundnuts. Constraints 
on women’s access to markets, thus, dramatically 
reduces their ability to secure and improve their 
position in the groundnut value chain and their access 
to and control of the benefits from the value chain 
(Cook et al. 2014).
The gendered division of labour in the groundnut value 
chain speaks to the social roles and expectations 
of men and women in Malawian society. Women 
are expected to dominate activities done within the 
homestead, whereas men are expected to venture out 
and interact with the outside world on behalf of their 
families. This explains why men dominate groundnut 
marketing activities while women are absorbed in 
production and processing activities. According to 
Diguid and Weber (2016), women are often limited to 
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work in the so-called ‘women’s realm’, such as care 
and domestic work, which makes them unable to 
effectively participate in off-farm economic activities, 
even when they are independent and better off socio-
economically. The paradox is that women’s additional 
productive tasks do not lead to a lessening or sharing 
of tasks in the household with their male counterparts 
(ILO 2014). So, whether in poor or better off households, 
married or independent, women continue their roles in 
child rearing, family care, and household maintenance. 
The decisions, either in poorer or better off households, 
to hire additional labour are made predominantly by 
men, which may not fully take into account the needs 
of women. Traditional, cultural, and social conceptions 
of the roles of women and men and their expected 
behavioural patterns shape their respective roles and 
the division of labour in the groundnut value chain, 
which impacts their access to and control of the 
benefits from the value chain.
6.2.4 Spotlight on the Mgona informal 
groundnut market
The Mgona market is underpinned by a wide array of 
social differentiation processes. Strikingly, all buyers of 
groundnuts at this market are foreigners. No Malawian 
buyers directly participate in this market. There 
is, however, a hierarchy of buyers who are mostly 
Burundians. Some richer Burundians sub-contract 
less well-off Burundians to buy groundnuts for them 
for a commission. This appears to be a structured 
way of facilitating upward mobility for those who are 
new, or as a way of kick-starting young adults to live 
independent lives. During the fieldwork for this study, 
we encountered a young Burundian woman, who had 
just completed her secondary education. She had 
ventured into groundnut buying for a commission as 
a means to raise her college fees to study fashion 
and design: ‘this is how our parents help us… you 
can choose to develop yourself into a competitive 
groundnut trader, or use it to raise resources to pursue 
a career or entrepreneurship of your choice’.
While the innovation of shelling machines has 
facilitated the growth of groundnut business, it also 
drives social differentiation, which determines the 
benefits accrued by different players in the market. All 
electric groundnut shelling machines are owned by 
Burundians, while most of the manual ones are owned 
by Malawians. The charges are higher for electric 
machines than for manual shelling machines. All the 
machine operators are men and all those engaged 
in sieving and grading groundnuts after shelling are 
women. Vendors supplying the Mgona market are also 
predominantly men. It is estimated that female vendors 
(who are mostly unmarried, divorced, or widowed and 
established businesswomen, having graduated from 
food vending) taking part in this market do not even 
make up 5 per cent of all suppliers. All groundnut 
buying agents commissioned by Burundians stationed 
in the villages are men. Women are involved largely 
as supporters to their husbands and not as principal 
points of contact and engagement.
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7.1 The political, economic and social 
context of the impacts of COVID-19
The groundnut value chain has endured the devastating 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, but for this impact 
to be fully appreciated, it has to be placed in a broader 
context. In Malawi, the context in which the pandemic 
broke out is critical to understanding how the response 
was handled, as well as its consequences, particularly 
in terms of its impact on the agri-food system, generally, 
and the groundnut value chain specifically. The first 
COVID-19 case in Malawi was diagnosed at the peak 
of political instability, following the nullification of the 21 
May 2019 elections by both the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal, due to widespread, 
grave, and systematic irregularities. As a result of the 
nullification of these elections, the court ordered that 
FPEs be held within 150 days of the Constitutional 
Court verdict on 3 February 2020. This order was 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal on May 8 
2020. 
The courts’ determination did not please former 
President Mutharika, who was intent on using COVID-19 
as a means to frustrate the holding of the FPEs as 
directed by the courts. He described the courts’ 
rulings as tantamount to a judicial coup d’état of his 
government (Chinsinga and Mihowa 2020). Alongside 
these political developments, citizens galvanised by 
the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) had 
been demonstrating against the government for nine 
consecutive months, demanding electoral justice. 
Citizens also used these demonstrations as an 
opportunity to voice their concerns on a number of 
other issues, such as deeply entrenched corruption in 
high places, nepotism, especially in recruitment in the 
public sector, collapsing service delivery in almost all 
sectors (including health, education, and agriculture), 
and worsening economic conditions, especially for 
those carrying out their trade in the informal sector.
Invoking the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act, 
through a presidential directive, the government 
declared COVID-19 a national disaster and took 
all necessary steps to contain its spread. These 
measures, announced on 23 March 2020, included 
the closure of all schools; the barring of gatherings of 
more than 100 persons, including those in churches 
and for weddings and funerals; and the suspension of 
issuing visas to citizens of countries highly affected by 
the coronavirus. This was followed by the Minister of 
Health declaring COVID-19 a formidable disease under 
the Public Health Act, which gave the Minister authority 
to issue rules aimed at the control and suppression 
of infectious diseases. Based on this authority, the 
Minister of Health issued the Public Health (Coronavirus 
Prevention Containment and Management) Rules 2020 
on 8 April 2020. These rules empowered the Minister of 
Health to impose a lockdown and outline the modalities 
thereof. Broadly speaking, the lockdown rules stated 
that all persons other than those exempted by the 
Minister must be confined to their place of residence. 
Exemptions to the rule included obtaining essential 
goods and services; seeking medical attention; visiting 
pharmacies, food supply stores, courts, or banks; 
and getting exercise, as long as no more than three 
persons exercise together.
A decision to implement a national lockdown, 
initially from 18 April to 9 May 2020, was made but 
it was never implemented. The announcement of the 
lockdown sparked spontaneous demonstrations and 
protests, especially among informal traders across 
the country (Mweninguwe 2020). The informal traders 
were opposed to the lockdown because it would 
create more hardship for them and their families 
in the absence of any livelihood support from the 
government. In the protests, some of the participants 
carried placards which, among other things, stated 
that: ‘lockdown is more poisonous than coronavirus’; 
‘we would rather die of corona than die of hunger’. This 
is not surprising because the majority of Malawians 
struggle for daily subsistence, they live on a hand to 
mouth basis. Moreover, unemployment levels are 
extremely high, especially among the youth. In fact, 
an estimated 53 per cent of the 17.6 million people 
in Malawi live in abject poverty, according to official 
statistics (NSO 2018).
Besides the protests, a group of concerned citizens 
and the HRDC moved the courts to grant an injunction 
against the implementation of the lockdown. A judge 
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of the High Court issued an injunction against the 
roll out of the lockdown measures on 17 April 2020, 
initially for seven days pending an inter-parte hearing. 
The judge agreed with the petitioners’ argument that 
the government had failed to put in place measures 
to cushion the poor during the proposed lockdown 
(Chiuta 2020). The HRDC stated that, ‘while we 
respect the health regulations regarding the lockdown, 
we want a lockdown that follows all laws and we do not 
want rights of vulnerable groups to suffer’. The concern 
about legal procedural irregularities in the conception 
and implementation of the proposed lockdown were 
further echoed by the Malawi Law Society. The judge 
further referred the case to the Constitutional Court 
because the issues raised by the petitioners required 
an interpretation of the Constitution. 
The lockdown measures were, to a very great extent, 
resisted because of the citizens’ perception that the 
former administration wanted to use the COVID-19 
pandemic as a pretext to either delay or eschew 
altogether the FPEs mandated by the courts. The 
attempts by the former administration to frustrate the 
holding of the elections, as sanctioned by the courts, 
simply deepened the ruling’s legitimacy during the 
crisis. According to Archard (2020), the legitimacy of a 
government deepens when a government suppresses 
the free flow of information; when it does not allow, 
empower, or capacitate independent institutions 
to check and validate its activities; when it does not 
enable citizens to independently organise to provide 
urgent services; when its data cannot be trusted; 
and when its officials, health professionals, or others, 
are afraid or prevented from speaking to power, and 
afraid to act decisively without strict orders from senior 
political leadership.
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Malawi can 
be distinguished into two broad categories: the general 
impact on the economy and the specific impact on the 
agricultural sector. Even though Malawi did not formally 
implement a lockdown, the impact of COVID-19 has 
been severe. The COVID-19 pandemic measures 
that citizens have been asked to observe have had 
significant consequences. Some of these negative 
effects have been amplified by the lockdown measures 
implemented in countries that trade with Malawi, both 
within the region and even beyond. The agri-food sector 
in the country has been disproportionately affected by 
the COVID-19 pandemic because of the heavy reliance 
on agriculture by the majority of Malawi’s population. 
About 80 per cent of the population is employed in 
the agricultural sector, which contributes around 33 
per cent to GDP and accounts for over 90 per cent 
of foreign exchange earnings (AGRA 2020; Campbell 
2020).
7.2 The impacts of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the economy
A comprehensive assessment of the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic has been made by AFAP (2020). 
The main thrust of these diagnoses is that the COVID-19 
pandemic has affected various sectors of the economy 
as a result of global and national actions. These 
actions have, in turn, disrupted the normal functioning 
of government, businesses, and people’s lives. It is 
against this backdrop that preliminary assessments 
from IFPRI indicate that COVID-19 restrictions are likely 
to cause overall GDP losses of 11.6 per cent in Malawi. 
These estimates are based on the social accounting 
matrix multiplier model. This model also projected that, 
with the restrictions in April and May 2020, about 1.1 
million people in Malawi would temporarily be pushed 
below the poverty line, mostly in rural areas.
AFAP’s (2020) analysis showed that services have 
been most affected (-US$155 million), followed 
by industry (-US$48 million), and then agriculture 
(-US$20 million). Agricultural GDP was projected to 
decline by 3.5 per cent, whilst agri-food systems were 
expected to contract by 8.2 per cent, largely due to 
the indirect impact of social distancing. During the 
presentation of the 2020/2021 budget in Parliament, 
the Minister of Finance announced a reduction of 35 
per cent in revenue collection, from across all sectors, 
by Malawi’s government due to the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. It is against this backdrop that 
the government revised its economic growth forecast 
for 2020 downwards to 1.9 per cent, from an earlier 
projection of 5.1 per cent.
The analysis by the World Bank (2020) is even more 
comprehensive. The point of departure of this analysis 
from IFPRI’s and AFRA’s was that Malawi’s economy 
was on a trajectory for its third year of faster growth in 
2020, before the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The economy grew by 4.4 per cent in 2019, a marked 
increase from 3.5 per cent in 2018. In fact, real GDP 
growth was projected in September 2019 at 4.8 
per cent. This was due to the expectation of the 
second consecutive year of strong harvests, offset 
by continuing political uncertainty, which weighed on 
business activity and investment. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the economy 
in five different ways (World Bank 2020). Disruptions 
to global value chains have affected the importation 
of key production inputs, especially from China, the 
EU, and South Africa, Malawi’s key trading partners. 
This increased trade and logistics costs and delays. 
For instance, Malawi Revenue Authority customs data 
suggest that imports were 26 per cent lower in April 
and May 2020, than in the same period in 2019. The 
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country is also suffering decreased demand in export 
markets. This is the case because key product markets 
are facing severe recessions, including the EU (which 
accounts for about 32 per cent of Malawi’s exports), 
South Africa (where 10 per cent of Malawi’s exports are 
sold), and the rest of Africa (which accounts 26 per cent 
of Malawi’s exports). There has also been a significant 
decrease in tourism, even though it is not a major 
driver of growth as it is in East African countries. The 
decrease in tourism is expected to reduce GDP growth 
of services, such as transport (which contributes 
to about 2.9 per cent of GDP) and accommodation 
and food services (which contribute about 2 per cent 
of GDP). Last but not least, remittances have also 
decreased due to lower global economic activity. 
Remittances through money transfers decreased by 
57 per cent in April 2020 and they have remained low 
since the outbreak of the pandemic. This could largely 
be attributed to strict lockdowns in South Africa, the 
largest source of Malawi’s remittances. 
7.3 The impact of COVID-19 on the 
agri-food sector
In the interviews conducted for this study, stakeholders 
focused on two key issues caused by COVID-19 that 
had negatively affected the groundnut value chain. 
Firstly, the pandemic has resulted in delays or serious 
disruptions to structured markets, or caused these 
markets to operate below optimum levels. Secondly, 
it has resulted in disruption and cancellation of post-
harvest field demonstrations, which help farmers 
to learn about how to take care of their groundnuts, 
especially in the context of the enduring aflatoxin 
challenge. 
The first impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
groundnut value chain was on the harvesting of 
groundnuts. The restriction measures were imposed 
towards the end of March 2020 and the first COVID-19 
cases were diagnosed in the beginning of April 
2020. This coincided with the harvest season for 
groundnuts, which runs from April through to June. 
These developments led to the panic harvesting of 
groundnuts, ‘which means that most farmers did 
not strictly follow the basic guidelines that control 
aflatoxin’.53 Most farmers ended up experiencing 
substantial post-harvest losses and poor quality 
groundnut harvests, which fetched less than usual 
when offered for sale to buyers. Some of the farmers 
encountered serious losses because they abandoned 
harvesting groundnuts for fear of contracting the 
53 Interview with an official of NASFAM, 1 September 2020
54 Ibid.
55 Interview with an official of one of the farmers’ organisations, 28 August 2020
56 Interview with one of the emerging local commodity traders, 29 August 2020
pandemic. Losses were particularly severe ‘for farmers 
that grow groundnuts on [a] fairly larger scale and 
rely on hired labour to do the work’.54 Labour was not 
readily available as even those who generally offer 
labour were engaged in panic harvesting of their own 
crops, especially maize.
The pandemic affected the functioning of ADMARC 
markets, which most farmers, especially those in 
rural areas, depend on to sell their produce. This 
also affected the activities of private companies that 
groundnut farmers almost entirely rely on to sell 
off their groundnuts. The absence, delay, or sub-
optimality of these markets meant that households 
have had diminished access to income from crops, 
which are their main source of livelihood. This has 
been a double edged sword for farmers: ‘farmers 
are losing income from either lack of, or existence 
of sub-optimal, markets, as well as increased costs 
due to delayed opportunities to sell’.55 The markets 
for groundnuts were erratic due to the impacts of the 
preventive measures to control the pandemic. The 
COVID-19 preventive and control measures disrupted 
transport and related logistics services; the operational 
processing capacity of companies, severely limiting 
their business; and, in some cases, led to permanent 
business closures (AGRA 2020). The measures thus 
led to increases in transportation costs; most buyers 
postponing their missions as a means of respecting 
social distancing or simply choosing to work from 
home; and slackness in business, limiting the buyers’ 
capacity to undertake purchases of crops. 
The pandemic has further affected the operations of 
output markets due to the impacts on regional and 
international markets. This is the case, especially 
for exporters, because there is uncertainty in terms 
of whether their contracts will be honoured or not, 
there has been a scale down in produce stocking, 
and produce sale prices are below production costs. 
Farmers have been forced to sell produce at very 
low prices to middlemen and market brokers due to 
market closures. One of the respondents interviewed 
for this study emphasised that, ‘this has been hugely 
felt by groundnut farmers who rely on private traders to 
dispose of their groundnuts… the pandemic has limited 
the scope of activities of these traders because of 
rising transport costs occasioned by the pandemic’.56
While the impact of COVID-19 has generally been 
severe on the groundnut value chain, it has been 
disproportionately felt by women and the youth. Poor 
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men, especially those who survive on petty trading and 
casual labour, have also been affected. As previously 
mentioned, women depend disproportionately on 
vendors to sell of their groundnuts. Most women 
have therefore not had access to markets as a result 
of the pandemic. In fact, vendors that will still trading 
were monopolised by men, who ordinarily venture 
out to seek lucrative markets, but were unable to 
do so because of the restrictions imposed by the 
COVID-19 control measures. It was also mostly 
women who were unable to fully harvest their 
fields due to labour constraints. These marketing 
dynamics for groundnuts have been captured by 
Matita and Chimombo (2020). In a survey, conducted 
between September and December 2020, Matita 
and Chimombo (2020) found that 64 per cent of 
the respondents stated that the number of traders 
doing business remained low. Furthermore, 50 per 
cent of respondents agreed that their ability to sell 
produce at both local markets and the farm gate had 
declined. This had prompted farmers who did have 
access to these markets, to sell a larger proportion 
of produce at a lower than usual price to fill income 
shortfalls from other sources. An AGRA (2020b) 
assessment reveals that the COVID-19 restrictive 
measures disproportionately affected women and 
youth in Southern Africa as they resulted in a severe 
loss of income and livelihood sources, following the 
closure and/or partial opening of informal business 
activities dominated by women and youth.
Campbell (2020) observed that lockdowns imposed 
by various countries have affected Malawi greatly, not 
only due to its landlocked nature, but also because 
it depends on imports of agricultural products and 
raw materials, which are used in the country. This 
has led to a shortage of agricultural inputs; increases 
in product and transport prices; low customer 
purchasing power; low agricultural input demand, 
leading to low sales; rising overhead costs etc. 
At the same time, it is important to note that the 
COVID-19 pandemic has become a fruitful business 
opportunity for well-established agri-SMEs that have 
been able to sell personal protective equipment, 
appropriate waste bins, water buckets, appropriate 
sanitizers and disinfectants, bulky farm produce 
etc. These SMEs have positioned themselves to 
work with local government, NGOs, and community 
based organisations to supply pertinent COVID-19 
products and services (AFAP 2020).
Both farmers and agri-SMEs noted that COVID-19 
has affected harvesting and winter demonstrations 
on topics such as post-harvest handling, chemical 
57 Interview with an official of Agriculture Direct Limited, 2 September 2020
calibration and safe use, and winter cropping. One of 
the SME officials interviewed for this study observed 
that, ‘post-harvest field days have been abandoned, 
which is a big blow because these field days act as 
both [a] learning and marketing platform for farmers 
and SMEs, respectively’.57 The field days serve as a 
marketing tool for existing and prospective farmers 
to appreciate, interact, and learn new farming 
techniques (Agriculture Direct Limited 2020). The 
COVID-19 pandemic has also negatively affected 
business by creating fear among farmers, which has 
resulted in most of them being afraid to purchase 
agri-inputs. This was attributed to the diminished 
market power of most farmers due to either the 
disruption, or the sub-optimal operation, of markets.
The pandemic has also greatly affected the provision 
of support services to the farmers (IFPRI 2020). 
These support services include extension systems, 
technical services, land administration services, 
and financial services. Officials from government 
extension and technical services have not been 
able to provide much support to farmers to help 
them achieve the best results due to restrictions on 
social distancing, movement, and office operations. 
Furthermore, due to the prioritisation of funding to 
health systems to support an increasing caseload of 
COVID-19 patients, which has resulted in reduced 
funding to agriculture, there have been fewer 
activities to support agricultural services.
The pandemic has, thus, affected agricultural inputs 
delivery, production systems, food security, and 
agricultural livelihoods. Emerging evidence from 
Malawi shows that the incidence of the pandemic has 
increased food insecurity and malnutrition, caused a 
loss of income, and resulted in declining livelihoods, 
especially for the majority of poor farmers in rural 
areas. According to WFP (2020), the number of 
households employing emergency livelihood based 
coping strategies is rising amid increasing prices 
of maize. A recently published fourth round WFP 
Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM) 
on the effects of COVID-19 in Malawi indicates 
that about 30 per cent of surveyed households 
reported having employed emergency livelihood-
based coping strategies within the last seven days to 
access food. This is a rise from round three (17 per 
cent), round two (20 per cent), and round one (16 per 
cent) of the survey, conducted between January and 
December 2020 (Phiri 2020; WFP 2020). This is a 
clear demonstration that the restrictions associated 
with COVID-19 have put serious strain on budgets 
and household resources, impacting people’s ability 
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to care for and nourish themselves and their families.
The WFP’s findings are further reinforced by Matita 
and Chimombo (2020), who report increased food 
insecurity among households in Mchinji and Ntchisi 
districts between September and December 2020. 
This increased food insecurity has been caused by 
significant declines in purchasing power and food 
demand among low income households, due to the 
loss of income and livelihood sources, coupled with 
the erratic operations of informal markets. There have 
been heightened levels of food and nutrition insecurity 
among vulnerable populations such as women, youth, 
and casual labourers. The survey results show that 
more households reported running out of food and 
skipping meals in round 2 than in round 1. The number 
of households running out of food increased from 54 
per cent to 67 per cent, whilst those skipping meals 
increased from 57 per cent to 77 per cent. Fifty-four 
per cent of survey respondents reported spending an 
entire day without eating due to lack of money and 
other resources (Matita and Chimombo 2020).
The view of most respondents to this study is that 
Malawi should exploit the COVID-19 pandemic as an 
opportunity to build back better (Campbell 2020). The 
underlying argument is that the COVID-19 pandemic 
has demonstrated the fragility of Malawi’s economy, 
which is underpinned almost exclusively by agriculture. 
The agriculture sector should be the starting point for 
the country to build back better and stronger. Baral, 
Das and Rustrick (2020) argue that the ultimate goal for 
Malawi should, therefore, be to build resilient farming 
communities. Communities become resilient if they 
are food and nutrition secure; are able to access and 
engage in reliable markets; are able to prioritise the 
well-being and participation of women and youth; and 
are able to withstand shocks, not only health shocks, 
but also those related to the climate, pests, and 
diseases. Strengthening the resilience of smallholder 
communities, who constitute over 2 million families 
and cultivate 4.5 million ha of land in Malawi, is critical 
to guaranteeing their food and nutrition security in the 
present and future. Failure to do so, will cause these 
communities to fall further behind and suffer serious 
consequences whenever shocks arise (AGRA 2020; 
Baral, Das and Rustrick 2020).
The belief is that by building a more robust agricultural 
system post-COVID-19, Malawi can grow its economy 
and be prepared for future crises. The priority policy 
prescription in this regard is towards the diversification 
of Malawi’s agriculture sector. This will help to increase 
farmer incomes and improve nutritional outcomes, as 
well as help Malawi become more resilient to external 
shocks. Consequently, Campbell (2020), calls upon 
international donors, as well as agricultural companies 
and investors to partner with Malawi’s government 
to promote system level change across the farming 
sector. This change should seek to improve the 
policy and regulatory environment, increase access 
to finance, and assist farmers in the transition from 
tobacco contract farming to high value horticulture and 
other crops.
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This paper has demonstrated that the groundnut 
value chain is a potentially significant alternative to 
the collapsing tobacco industry, but it is currently 
neglected by government, while being exploited by a 
cartel of traders (domestic and foreign), technocrats, 
and politicians for selfish interests. The story told in this 
paper explains the rise and fall of the groundnut value 
chain, as well as its re-emergence in a fundamentally 
reconstituted political, economic, and social context. 
Between the 1970s and 1980s, groundnuts were one of 
the leading cash crops exported to Europe, as well as 
regional markets, but this trade collapsed at the turn of 
the 1990s. Both production and exports of groundnuts 
collapsed due to the failure to contain aflatoxin 
contamination to acceptable levels, as demanded 
by the European market. Aflatoxin is regarded as a 
serious health hazard, which has the potential to cause 
liver cancer. The collapse of the groundnut value 
chain was exacerbated by the introduction of SAPs 
under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF, which 
fundamentally changed the institutional context for the 
groundnut value chain (Matita 2018; Mgalamadzi 2018). 
The reference to SAPs is still relevant three decades or 
so later, largely because of the enduring legacy that 
the policies have had on the country’s ability to drive 
its development agenda, which have been informed by 
endogenous rather than exogenous considerations.
The stringent measures against excess aflatoxin levels 
in groundnut exports and the changing institutional 
environment propagated by the implementation of SAPs 
negatively affected the productivity of groundnuts. The 
cultivation of groundnuts among smallholder farmers 
declined following the liberalisation of the cultivation 
of tobacco, which fetched higher prices especially in 
the initial years. As a crop dominated by smallholder 
farmers, the shift to tobacco transformed groundnuts 
into a predominantly subsistence crop and essentially 
a women’s crop (Farm Radio International 2013; 
NASFAM 2013). The implementation of SAPs targeted 
the restructuring of ADMARC, particularly in terms of 
its scope of operations. ADMARC no longer provided 
smallholder farmers with ready access to inputs, such 
as improved groundnut seed varieties, and markets, 
particularly for those in remote areas. The structured and 
predictable market offered by ADMARC was replaced 
by vendors, who concentrate their activities in easy 
to reach areas and are known for their unscrupulous 
business tendencies. This largely disadvantaged 
women farmers, who are forced to rely on vendors as 
their primary market for groundnuts. The dominance 
of vendors as an alternative market for groundnuts 
also led to the collapse of grading as a prerequisite for 
selling groundnuts. Previously, ADMARC only bought 
from smallholder farmers who had carefully graded 
their groundnuts. The sale of ungraded groundnuts 
to vendors has made it very difficult for the groundnut 
export market to recover because this practice has 
progressively led to the deterioration of the quality of 
groundnuts.
There have been several efforts to revive the production, 
as well as the export, of groundnuts. These initiatives 
have been largely successful in terms of reviving 
groundnut productivity, but have failed to reclaim the 
share of the export market that collapsed at the turn of 
the 1990s. The revival in the productivity of groundnuts 
is attributed to several policy interventions, some of 
which are locally driven, while others are externally 
supported. However, the most notable policy in this 
regard is the NES (2012–2018). This strategy sought to 
promote legumes or oil seeds (groundnuts, soya beans, 
and pigeon peas) as a potential alternative to tobacco, 
as a leading foreign exchange earner, especially in view 
of the intensification of the anti-smoking lobby. The 
paradox, however, is that the designation of oil seeds 
as a potential alternative leading foreign exchange 
earner has not been matched by public investment to 
promote the progressive development of these value 
chains. Public investment to support, for example, 
ready access to seed for the crops is very limited. 
The existing seed system is largely supported by 
development partners, such as USAID and Irish Aid, 
which have been instrumental in the development of 
improved varieties. However, these improved varieties 
have not been made readily available to farmers. 
As the groundnut value chain gains momentum as a 
potential alternative cash crop to tobacco, men are 
increasingly displacing women as principal actors in 
the value chain, especially with regards to marketing 
activities. There are several factors that are driving 
social differentiation within the value chain, which 
work predominantly against women. For example, 
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compared to women, men have better access to 
and control over land, labour, credit, improved seed, 
knowledge (through clubs and often as association 
leaders), and even lucrative markets (Cook et al. 2014). 
This social differentiation within the groundnut value 
chain needs to be placed into the broader context 
of social differentiation processes in rural Malawi to 
be fully understood. There are two main processes 
driving social differentiation in rural Malawi, namely: 
the liberalisation of the cultivation of burley tobacco 
and the emergence of medium-scale farms, through 
both endogenous and exogenous forces. Building on 
the legacy of the one-party political settlement, the 
liberalisation of the cultivation of burley tobacco has 
created better off smallholders. These smallholders 
own more than 2ha of land and are connected to 
economically well-established families (comprising of 
retired public sector employees and successful local 
entrepreneurs); influential traditional leaders; political 
elites, especially the party in power; or, in some cases, 
are themselves, government frontline workers, such 
as teachers, field assistants, community development 
assistants etc. These better off smallholders are 
emerging as patrons and largely as interlocutors with 
the outside world, thereby monopolising opportunities 
associated with such engagements and propagating 
social differentiation. In addition, the accelerated 
development of medium-scale farmers is furthering the 
processes of social differentiation. The development of 
medium-scale farmers is led by the acquisition of land 
from desperate smallholders by middle-aged white 
collar employees, who are predominantly male and 
working in the private and public sectors. Farmers from 
better off families in rural areas are also buying up land 
to become medium-scale farmers. These medium-
scale farmers are predominantly male because of 
the cultural, traditional, and social disadvantages that 
women face when it comes to inheritance and decision 
making processes at the household level.
Although not all women are disadvantaged, the 
findings of this study show that men are generally 
better off compared to women, especially within the 
framework of the groundnut value chain. Women who 
are independent (divorced, unmarried, and widowed), 
better off, and connected to influential families in 
politics, local leadership, and business, are able to 
assert themselves as key players in the groundnut 
value chain. Poorer men are also disadvantaged in 
the value chain, but poorer women are even worse 
off. Poor men usually have an advantage over their 
female counterparts in leadership positions in clubs 
or associations and decision making processes within 
the household, as well as in their ability to venture out 
of the homestead to engage with the outside world. 
Culturally, women are expected to defer to men and 
it is expected that women should spend most of their 
time undertaking domestic work, such as child birth, 
child care, household maintenance, and caregiving. 
Likewise, while the youth are marginalised, male youth 
are slightly better off than female youth. Male youth, 
especially those with some level of education, are 
able to explore opportunities in the informal economy, 
but the majority of their female counterparts are 
overburdened with domestic responsibilities, which 
are not often recognised as payable work. This 
greatly reflects the influence of Malawi’s rural cultural 
disposition, whereby male children are groomed as 
potential heirs to their fathers’ inheritance, which puts 
their female counterparts at a huge disadvantage when 
it comes to controlling resources.
The findings of this study demonstrate the impact of 
intersectionality on the welfare of women. Women 
are adversely affected in the groundnut value chain, 
not only because they are generally poorer than their 
male counterparts, but also because of the cultural, 
traditional, and social orientations that limit their sphere 
of action. Women are expected to carry out essentially 
all unpaid domestic work and they are not culturally 
expected to venture into economic activities that take 
them away from the homestead for prolonged periods 
without being sanctioned by the menfolk, even when 
they are not married. In cases where they are said to 
have control over land, women still cannot make critical 
decisions about it without deferring to their brothers, 
uncles, husbands, and even elder sons. The question 
of intersectionality applies to poorer men and youth as 
well. Poorer men tend to have limited access to land 
or are landless, usually depend on exploitative casual 
labour for employment, and are often disadvantaged 
in leadership positions, which are very key for social 
mobility in a context where patron-client relationships 
are dominant. The youth lack access to land in their own 
right, they cannot participate in clubs or associations, 
and cannot access lucrative markets when they 
manage to produce groundnuts. The impacts of 
COVID-19 have underscored the intersectionality 
of social differentiation, which affects the welfare of 
women, poorer men, and youth. These groups have 
not been able to access markets, even the informal 
ones, which have been largely monopolised by men 
who have better social capital networks that they can 
leverage in these difficult circumstances.
The study further demonstrates that there are winners 
and losers within the framework of the groundnut value 
chain, even though it is suffering neglect and only the 
chaotic informal markets are thriving. There is some 
contestation between and among actors with regards 
to the operation of export mandates, which, if properly 
implemented, would help to formalise commodity 
53Working Paper 056 | March 2021
exports from the country. This, in turn, would enhance 
the proceeds that the country gets from agriculture, 
which are currently very low. While there seems to be 
general appreciation about the desirability of putting 
export mandates in place, there are contestations 
about exactly how this should be done. The positions of 
the key stakeholders, as discussed in this paper, show 
that each stakeholder group is bent on protecting their 
benefits, arising from the current configuration of the 
value chain. Behind the position of each stakeholder, 
there are specific interests that they want to promote, 
either by pushing for the export mandates to operate 
in a particular way, or avoiding the operationalisation of 
the mandates altogether. The interests of the different 
stakeholders are further evident in the operations of 
the Mgona informal groundnut export market. Mgona 
is a thriving market despite its obvious illegality. Both 
traders and government officials condemn it, but 
no concrete action has been taken to regulate it or 
abandon it altogether. While farmer organisations 
have attempted to bring up the issue of this market 
and its ramifications on the commodity market, it 
continues to operate within a 20km radius from the 
seat of government and in the context of a newly 
operationalised CGA (2017). Under this Act, a trader 
in agricultural commodities is required to obtain an 
authorisation letter from the Ministry of Agriculture 
before applying for a license from the Ministry of Trade. 
This means that any trader who imports or exports 
licensable goods without a requisite license commits 
an offense punishable by law.
The experiences of the groundnut value chain in Malawi 
demonstrate that agricultural policy processes are 
inherently political. While policies that are implemented 
are broadly touted as being in the interest of 
smallholder farmers, or indeed, farmers more broadly, 
stakeholders at each stage in the value chain have 
particular interests that they want to promote, often 
for selfish interests and motives. The losers are almost 
always the smallholder farmers. This realisation, serves 
to emphasise that policies are often implemented, 
not because they are poised to make a difference to 
the livelihoods of Malawians, but because they will 
facilitate the extraction of rents and direct benefits for 
the political elite (Chinsinga 2018; Cammack 2010). 
The significance of PEA, therefore, is that it helps to 
identify and understand the political, economic, and 
social processes that promote or block pro-poor 
change, as well as the role of institutions, power, and 
the underlying policy context.
The fate of groundnut commercialisation in Malawi is 
a combination of several factors, but the watershed 
moment remains the introduction of SAP policy 
prescriptions. The responses to the debilitating effects 
of SAPs, coupled with the culture of opportunism 
and corruption inherent in the competitive clientelist 
political settlement, has led to the re-emergence of 
the groundnut value chain in an informal and chaotic 
context. This has led to the apparent strategic 
neglect and consequent capture of the value chain 
by a cartel of politicians, technocrats, and traders 
(local and foreign). So, while the groundnut value 
chain has tremendous potential as an alternative to 
the fledgling tobacco industry, this potential cannot 
be realised because of the perverse incentives that 
underpin Malawi’s contemporary political economy. 
Through the groundnut value chain, this paper 
therefore demonstrates how different groups in society 
compete for and use resources, rents, and power at 
their disposal. The findings imply that the manner in 
which competition for and use of resources, rents, and 
power pans out, either leads to growth, transformation, 
and improved well-being, or stagnation and poverty 
(Prowse and Grassin 2020). 
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Annex 1: The hypotheses applicable to Malawi’s groundnut value chain
ANNEXES
The three key hypotheses deemed applicable for Malawi, arising out of the work of Poulton and Chinsinga 
(2018), are as follows:
• If the country is landlocked, engagement in the value chain by national elites takes the form of 
acquiring land for crop production, seeking to secure reliable market outlets and prices for their 
produce through manipulation of state policies, and/or orchestrating the availability of cheap inputs 
(e.g. fertilisers), equipment (e.g. tractors), and services that they can ‘capture’.
• If production of the crop primarily takes place in sub-national regions with high population density 
(greater than 200 persons per km2); production and sale for market are both dominated by 
smallholder farmers, despite the interest of larger players in entering the value chain. Conversely, 
where production of the crop primarily takes place in sub-national regions with low to medium 
population density (less than 200 persons per km2); medium and perhaps also large-scale farms 
have expanded their production and marketing of the crop dramatically over the past decade.
• If traditional development partners have engaged actively with the value chain over the past 
decade: policy interventions have both been designed to stimulate commercialisation in some form 
or another and to facilitate the participation of smallholder farmers in the resulting commercialisation 
processes.
The findings of this paper shed light on the three key hypotheses deemed applicable for Malawi as follows:
• With respect to the first hypothesis, groundnuts are not a major source of foreign exchange for 
Malawi in which case the second part of the hypothesis does not apply. As demonstrated in this 
paper, the production of groundnuts is dominated by smallholder farmers. It is estimated that as 
much as 93 per cent of groundnuts are produced by smallholder farmers, with the estate sector 
contributing the rest. There is, however, likely to be some significant changes to this structure 
of production in the near future, especially following the collapse of the tobacco industry. It was 
established during the fieldwork for this study that some tobacco companies are diversifying their 
portfolio to include the cultivation of groundnuts on a larger scale, for both domestic and export 
markets. Additionally, the emergence of medium-scale farms has exploded, especially in areas that 
are within 120km radius of the capital city, Lilongwe. These medium-scale farms are dominated 
by elites, working largely in the public and private sectors (including those who have just retired 
from active service). The majority of these farmers are venturing into the production of seed, either 
for groundnuts or maize (Chinsinga 2018). This is a very lucrative business and most of them 
exploit the networks that they have within the public and private sectors. The reforms to FISP to 
allow non-STAM members to supply seed, especially OPV, are illustrative of the elite’s capture of 
state policies to their advantage. Moreover, those in the public sector are mostly in policy making 
positions. There is evidence to suggest that these individuals strategically manipulate policies to 
ensure that they benefit their own farming activities. Some of these medium-scale farmers have 
ventured into the production of legumes, especially groundnuts and soya beans, to take advantage 
of export opportunities available under the auspices of NES. Prior to the adoption of the revised 
CGA (2017), the government had a tendency of implementing ad hoc export bans on essential 
commodities, especially maize and legumes, often on the pretext of protecting and guaranteeing 
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food security. Yet, politically connected individuals and companies, including technocrats continued 
to export these commodities informally, getting premium prices. As discussed in this paper, these 
malpractices continue today, making it very difficult for the government to enforce its own legislative 
framework. While a potentially robust legislative framework exists, it is not effectively enforced 
because a cartel of politicians, technocrats, and traders systematically subvert it to promote their 
own selfish interests, goals, and objectives.
• With respect to the second hypothesis, the production of groundnuts indeed happens in areas 
of high population density. The production and sale for the market are dominated by smallholder 
farmers. While it is true that there is interest from medium-scale farmers in the groundnut value 
chain, they do not often produce groundnuts for formal marketing channels. These medium-scale 
farmers predominantly invest in the production of seed. The land that they use is not virgin land, 
land that has never been cultivated. They acquire it from smallholder farmers, who are, in turn, 
becoming landless and working on these farms as labourers. The majority of these smallholder 
farmers are women, particularly poorer, divorced, or widowed women, and a disproportionate share 
of this land is being grabbed from them and offered for sale. Of course, poorer men are selling off 
their land too (often less than 0.5ha) and the buyers are consolidating it. Existing statistics show 
that the magnitude of land ownership per capita has dramatically declined. It is estimated that 90 
per cent of the smallholder farmers who cultivate groundnuts do so on less than 0.5ha. Besides 
the obvious question of land constraints, the scale of groundnut production is limited by its labour 
intensive nature and high seed density requirement (Nyondo, Nankhuni, and Me-ksope 2018). This 
high demand for labour and seed makes it very difficult for most smallholder farmers, who are 
poor, to cultivate groundnuts on more than 0.5ha, even when they may have adequate land at their 
disposal.
• With respect to the final hypothesis, efforts to promote the cultivation of groundnuts have been 
supported almost exclusively by traditional donors, namely, USAID and Irish Aid. Indeed, the 
ultimate goal of these donors has been to promote the involvement of smallholder farmers in the 
production of groundnuts and facilitate the value chain’s ultimate commercialisation. Working with 
and through ICRISAT, these donors have supported efforts to make improved groundnut varieties 
available, which are disease resistant, high yielding, and have attributes that buyers look for, 
especially in exports. As pointed out in this paper, after the full-scale implementation of the SAP 
policy prescriptions, smallholder farmers have found it very difficult to access improved groundnut 
seed. As such, they have resorted to using local varieties, which are less productive, especially 
in the wake of variable and erratic climatic patterns (Simtowe et al. 2009). These donors have 
worked to produce breeder and foundational groundnut seed, but with very little success in terms 
of getting the seed into the hands of farmers on a large scale. The donors have also sought to 
improve the capacity of smallholder farmers to address the enduring problem of aflatoxin, which 
makes it very difficult for Malawian groundnuts to break into lucrative export markets. Public efforts 
to support the seed system have been limited compared to those directed at tobacco and maize, 
which are dominated by multinational seed companies. Government support is weak because 
groundnuts are not a major foreign exchange earner. The crop is not an important source of rent for 
the political elite, especially for purposes of cultivating and maintaining political support. The latest 
effort by USAID to support the groundnut value chain is through a programme called FtF-INVC, 
which aims to provide support and facilitate the expansion of access to markets for smallholder 
farmers involved in growing soya beans and groundnuts.
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Annex 2: List of interviews
• Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of ADMARC
• Interview with a former official of NASFAM
• Interview with an official of NASFAM
• Interview with the Country Director of ICRISAT
• Interview with the Programme Manager of ICRISAT
• Interviews with members of GTAM
• Interviews with officials of GTAM
• Interview with the President of FUM
• Interview with a Chief Executive of a farmers’ organisation
• Interviews with officials from various farmers’ organisation
• Interview with the Coordinator of one of the government’s supported agricultural projects
• Interview with one of the leading Agricultural Economists in Malawi
• Interviews with several officials from the Ministry of Agriculture
• Interview with the Manager of an agricultural commercialisation project supported by the 
World Bank
• Interview with the General Manager of Exageris
• Interview with an official of Agriculture Direct Limited
• Interviews with vendors at the Mgona informal groundnut export market
• Interviews with Burundian traders at the Mgona informal groundnut export market
• Interviews with several emerging local traders
• Interview with the Acting Chief Executive Officer of FUM
• Interviews with officials from multinational seed companies
• Interviews with several traditional leaders in Mchinji
• Interviews with several traditional leaders in Ntchisi
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